[kelnos]

Would Russia perhaps have already conquered Ukraine without sanctions? Would Iran have destroyed Israel by now without sanctions? Would NK have become a nuclear power much earlier, and have a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons today, were it not for sanctions?

I don't know the answers to those questions, but I wouldn't be surprised if it was "yes".

[johnisgood]

> Iran is not the only example in which sanctions have resulted in unintended consequences. Since 1970, unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. have achieved foreign policy goals in just about 13% of cases, according to one study. A recent Congressional Research report evaluating U.S. sanctions in Venezuela found that sanctions “exacerbated an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis caused by government mismanagement and corruption that has promoted 7.7 million Venezuelans to flee.” U.S. sanctions also exacerbated humanitarian crises in North Korea, reported UNICEF, putting 60,000 vulnerable children at risk of starvation due to limited humanitarian aid.

https://washingtondc.jhu.edu/news/do-sanctions-actually-work...

[lazide]

Russia lost (in a real sense), when their blitzkrieg of Kiev failed. From that point on, it’s just how much they turn the crank on the meat grinder that is trench warfare. It’s the nature of the bet that is inherent in Blitzkrieg. Ukraine/Russia is about who is going to lose more after that, not who can win. No one can win anymore.

Sanctions or lack thereof definitely impacts quality of life, but Putin put everything on a war economy footing pretty quickly anyway, and in that environment (especially in Russia), it’s suffering all the way down. And Russia excels at Suffering. Russia has oil too, and plenty of minerals, so if anything I expect by now they’re just getting stronger (economically), barring Ukraine wrecking their shit from time to time with a well placed drone strike.

Iran/Israel is an interesting question, but near as I can tell, Iran doesn’t really want to destroy Israel. They just want to make them as miserable as possible, and show they can ‘do harm’ to them when they need to prop up domestic support among the hardliners.

Israel provides a good scapegoat for the Iranian leadership.

With Israel gone, who is the Ayatollah going to use as the big bad? The Great Satan (USA) isn’t as tractable a target when they don’t have a designated ‘local’ they can go after, and if Iran actually meaningfully hurt the US (nuked the White House?), Iran is glass regardless of how otherwise strong they are.

NK got sanctions because they love playing the crazy-dude-with-a-gun-that-just-wants-a-handout, which is also why they eventually got nukes. They might have gotten nukes a little faster without sanctions, but sanctions definitely gave the hardliners huge leverage in the country. Hard to be friendly with the west (as a civilian!) when the west is literally openly starving the country, even if the leadership of your country is egging them on eh?

Near as I can tell, the USSR fell because of jeans and rock and roll. So yes, I think the ‘good guy’ sanctions BS is ultimately self defeating.

It can work if someone is either a) in a tenuous economic position, and b) the ‘sanctioningish’ behavior is not existential.

But any good authoritarian would rather throw their entire population under the bus ‘for the greater good’ than give in on something important for them…

And countries know how to deal with being at war (generally), even if it’s a weird only-semi-economic one.

[myrmidon]

I agree with a lot of what you say, but I think one aspect of sanctions that you are missing a bit is that they stifle growth (especially long-term) by forcing the victim to waste ressources on unwanted/inefficient industries or convoluted procurement.

Basically, you are hurting your own economy (non negligibly in the EU-Russia case for example!) to make sure that you outgrow the sanctioned opponent, making any future conflict more favorable for yourself.

There is a lot of evidence that this aspect works pretty well; even if you can sidestep the sanctions with middle-men or substitute local industry, this always comes with additional friction/costs (just consider German synth fuel industry during WW2-- that was an insane amount of ressources that could've gone into planes or tanks or somesuch instead).

For an example of sanctions directly effecting diplomatic outcomes, just consider Jordan over the Gulf wars: They stayed neutral during the first one (which Bush did NOT like), got sanctioned (without western citizens even noticing too much), suffered a lot from that, then during the second Iraq war they basically cooperated with the US (grudgingly!).

I think it is difficult to find many clear examples for this because sanctions typically mostly work as a threat, and being put in place is a kind of failure mode for them already.

[dh2022]

How can Russia be economically stronger under sanctions? Before the war they were able to manufacture some goods (Volkswagen had a couple of factories. I think Unilever was making some washers/ dryers). This is all replaced by manufacturing of some weapons (which proven themselves so shitty in the war that no outside buyers want to buy them).

Russia went from selling their oil on the world market at competitive prices to selling to mostly 2 customers at heavily discounted prices. And Russia is going to use barter now because of financial sanctions on Russian oil buyers.

All Russian currency reserves are frozen, and the interest these reserves generate are given to Ukraine to buy weapons.

How is Russia economically better now than before Feb 2022?

[lazide]

It depends entirely on what you mean by ‘strength’, and ‘better’. Russia is ramping up its military industrial complex like no one’s business, for instance.

Manufacturing in general, actually.

Something which had essentially collapsed previously. Also, mining and other resource extraction - they’re necessarily rebuilding domestic production and becoming more independent.

[dh2022]

Well, yeah, sure, they are building lots of shitty weapons. Meanwhile they cannot take over an adversary a third of its size. About resource extraction - the West stopped giving Russia extraction technology. Which means Russia is coasting on what they had up to 2022. Meaning in a few years Russia will do what it did in the 70s: over-extract its most productive fields. To see how that movie ended read Gaidar's Collapse of an Empire.

[542354234235]

Russia has had to sell oil at a steep discount, which has cut into their revenue significantly. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been frozen/seized that can't be used to fund the war effort. Modern war is not just "beans and bullets”, and Russia pays upwards of 10 times the price for key components it needs for missiles, aviation, UAVs, tanks, artillery, air defense, etc. as well as quality manufacturing equipment needed.

Russian industry is operating at only 81% capacity, largely due to labor shortages, which make sense considering that about 1% of its labor force join the military every other month. Russia is losing tank barrels, artillery barrels, and infantry fighting vehicles more than 10 times faster than it can manufacture new ones. It will likely never be able to obtain a third rotary forge, required for barrel manufacture, to expand its capacity. It has almost entirely cannibalized its old, defunct Soviet era stock. They are being kept afloat by China, NK, and Iran, but with a much-reduced capacity, and often much lower quality. For example, Russia relies on China for 70-80% of its microchips, but China is dumping defective microchips on them with a 40% failure rate.

Sanctions have absolutely had significant, direct, measurable impacts on Russia’s ability to wage war and sustain war.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/21/half-of-russias-ai... https://jamestown.org/program/russia-exhausts-soviet-era-arm... https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-where-are-russias-... https://archive.ph/c17pk https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-202... https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-sanctions-have-reshaped-ru... https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/comme... https://osintforukraine.com/publications/microchips https://www.theregister.com/2022/10/18/russia_china_semicond...

[lazide]

I’m not saying the sanctions haven’t hurt, rather that when the war was at its decisive point (the first few days) they did not exist/were immaterial. Now they’re just doing more damage in an already damaging (and unwinnable) situation.

[dh2022]

The biggest sanctions were adopted after the war started (and then the West kept piling up new sanctions every few months).

Are you suggesting the West should have put these harsh sanctions before the war? My recollection of Dec 2021 and Jan/Feb 2022 were that the West was trying to avoid inciting the crazy Russian dictator: Biden had two tele conferences with Putin in December, there were three meetings in Jan (OSCE - Russia, NATO - Russia, Lavrov - Blinken)

And I do not think the situation is unwinnable for the West (it is probably unwinnable for Ukraine as it will not be able to get its territory back). Russia is getting weaker with every man it loses, every tank is destroyed, every young man/woman who decides to leave. I would be surprised if Western Europe will want to do business with Russia for a generation - which basically makes Russia China's vassal for the same period of time.

Russia will be in bad shape for decades. The West will be just fine.

[int_19h]

The West should have put boots on the ground in Ukraine before Russia invaded. That was the one thing that would have prevented the war. Hell, they should have had EU peacekeepers along the line of contact back in 2015.

The kind of sanctions that we've seen since then seem to be mostly about appearances, with EU trying to pretend that it "really cares" despite this epic failure of foreign policy.

[lazide]

The west is screwed too, because Russia is (and has been) doing everything it can to poison that well too - and widely succeeding.

Or do you think all this authoritarianism sprouting everything is just random coincidence?

It’s classic crabs in a bucket, which Russia has always been good at.

[542354234235]

I have seen no serious analysis saying that Russia losing the war has been basically inevitable since the first few weeks of the war. Russia is fighting a war of attrition now and has been for most of the war. Most analysis still assess Russia can attrite it's way to victory. Sanctions are important because even if Putin is willing to throw wave after wave of his own men to the slaughter (a million Russian casualties and counting), if they run out of vehicles or artillery barrels, they are kind of screwed.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukrai...

[lazide]

Russia is hollowing out its male population which was already under severe strain.

Even if Russia ‘wins’ the Ukraine war (takes all Ukrainian territory), it’s even more fucked than when it started demographically.

It’s also spent pretty much all of it’s currency reserves and destroyed it’s normal economy destroying all that ‘new’ land in a way it will be incredibly hostile to productive use for a generation+. Not counting insurgencies and rebellions.

The well is solidly poisoned, regardless of who ends up owning it.

[542354234235]

Also known as a pyrrhic victory. Russia winning the war and Russia coming out on top, or coming out better than it started, are not the same thing.

[jimbohn]

The USSR fell because its economic model didn't work and was a society steered by corrupt principles. Jeans and rock and roll "envy" was just a symptom. After having seen the effect of communism/russianism on post-soviet countries I'd rather take a nuclear bomb, it's better in the long term. Sanctions work but it depends what you are min-maxing because obviously some sanctions may hurt your own country/block.