[jabbany]

Browser extensions also have a relatively robust permissions-based system.

If they wanted to, one would guess that browser-ish local apps based on stuff like Electron/node-webkit could probably figure out some way to limit extension permissions more granularly.

[0cf8612b2e1e]

I would have thought, but it has been how many years, and as far as I know, there is still no segregation for VSCode extensions. Microsoft has all the money and if they cannot be bothered, not encouraged that smaller applications will be able to iron out the details.

[jabbany]

I think it's just because supply-chain attacks are not common enough / their attack surfaces not large enough to be worth the dev time... yet...

Sneak in a malicious browser extension that breaks the permissions sandbox, and you have hundreds of thousands to millions of users as an attack surface.

Make a malicious VSCode/IDE extension and maybe you hit some hundreds or thousands of devs, a couple of smaller companies, and probably can get on some infosec blogs...

[fauigerzigerk]

>Make a malicious VSCode/IDE extension and maybe you hit some hundreds or thousands of devs, a couple of smaller companies, and probably can get on some infosec blogs..

Attackers just have to hit one dev with commit rights to an app or library that gets distributed to millions of users. Devs are multipliers.

[anon7000]

The time has come. The nx supply chain attack a couple weeks ago literally exfiltrated admin tokens from your local dev machine because the VS code extension for nx always downloaded the latest version of nx from npm. And since nx is a monoreop tool, it’s more applicable to larger projects with more valuable tokens to steal.

[connicpu]

The solution at my job is you can only install extensions vetted by IT and updates are significantly delayed. Works well enough but sucks if you want one that isn't available inside the firewall.

[sunaookami]

>Browser extensions also have a relatively robust permissions-based system.

Yeah and they suck now. We need a better security model where it's still possible to do powerful stuff on the whole machine (it's MY computer after all) without compromises.

[Barrin92]

>We need a better security model where it's still possible to do powerful stuff on the whole machine

That's not possible. If you can do powerful stuff on the whole machine by definition you have no security. Security is always a question of where you create a perimeter. You can hand someone a well defined box in which they can do what they want, you can give someone broader access with fewer permissions, but whether vertically or horizontally to have security is to exercise control and limit an attack surface.

That's even implicit in the statement that it's YOUR computer. The justification being that there's a dividing line between your computer and other computers. If you'd be part of of a network, that logic ceases to hold. Same when it comes to components on your machine.