I would agree if this were one of those `curl | sh` scenarios, but don't we consider things like `brew` to be sufficiently low-risk, akin to `apt`, `dnf`, and the like?
> Unfortunately, in the world of software there are bad actors that bundle malware with their apps. Even so, Homebrew Cask has long decided it will not be an active gatekeeper (macOS already has one) and users are expected to know about the software they are installing. This means we will not always remove casks that link to these apps, in part because there is no clear line between useful app, potentially unwanted program, and the different shades of malware—what is useful to one user may be seen as malicious by another.
---
So there might be pull requests, but Brew's official stance is that they do not actively moderate casks for malware. I guess there's something built into the MacOS packaging step that help mitigate the risk, but I don't know much about it outside playing w/ app development in XCode.
Agreed that it's a bit funny given the context and no community-managed package manager should be 100% trusted.
That said, I think rg is pretty well known to linux daily-drivers and they just wanted to share something quickly for powerusers who want to check their workspaces quickly. Probably better to just instruct n00bs to use grep than install a whole cli tool for searching
Come to think of it, I wonder if a 2-phase attack could be planned by an attacker in the future: Inject malware into a package, flood guidance with instructions to install another popular tool that you also recently compromised... lol
The xscreensaver dev managed to very easily slip a timebomb in to the debian repos. Wasn't obscured in any way, the repo maintainers just don't review the code. It would be physically impossible for them to review all the changes in all the programs.
Yes, the XZ attack affected Fedora nightly and Debian testing and unstable. Yes, it got caught before it made it into a stable distribution (this time).
> Many people also don’t vendor their own dependencies, which would slow down the spread at the price of not being instantly up to date.
npm sold it really hard that you could rely on them and not have to vendor dependencies yourself. If I suggested that a decade ago in Seattle, I would have gotten booed out of the room.
I have repeatedly been met with derision when pointing out what a gaping security nightmare the whole Open Source system is, especially npm and its ilk.
Yet here we are. And this is going to get massively worse, not better.
I thought getting code into brew is blocked by some vetting (potentially insufficient, which could be argued for all supply chains), whereas getting code into npm involves no vetting whatsoever.
> Unfortunately, in the world of software there are bad actors that bundle malware with their apps. Even so, Homebrew Cask has long decided it will not be an active gatekeeper (macOS already has one) and users are expected to know about the software they are installing. This means we will not always remove casks that link to these apps, in part because there is no clear line between useful app, potentially unwanted program, and the different shades of malware—what is useful to one user may be seen as malicious by another.
ripgrep is quite well known. It’s not some obscure tool. Brew is a well-established package manager.
(I get that the same can be said for said for npm and the packages in question, but I don’t really see how the context of the thread matters in this case).
If it produces no output, does that mean that there's no code that could act in the future?
I first acted out of nerves and deleted the whole node-modules and package.lock in a couple of freshly opened Astro projects, curious if I should considered my web surfing to still be potentially malicious
The malware introduced here is a crypto address swapper. It's possible that even after deleting node_modules that some malicious code could persist in a browser cache.
If you have crypto wallets on the potentially compromised machine, or intend to transfer crypto via some web client, proceed with caution.