[delichon]

> it keeps the board focused on long term performance of monetary policy instead of focusing on the next election.

The neutral dispassionate bureaucrat is a unicorn. One might exist but I won't bet on Diogenes ever finding them. It would be a strange alchemy for political appointees to transmutate into unbiased technicians. As with SCOTUS, a longer term is mostly a longer period to apply partisan values.

[jljljl]

You probably can't eliminate any sort of political bias, but a single 14 year term puts you pretty much outside of any electoral cycle considerations, which is important for maintaining long term stability in monetary. Making them have to stand for election or make the president happy every 4 years would completely eliminate any ability for the board to focus on the actual technical issues. There's a reason why countries that eliminate CRB independence tend to see hyper inflation

It also isn't a lifetime appointment, and tenures are staggered so the board isn't fixed in place for generation like the Supreme Court

[deeg]

I hear where you're coming from but an independent Fed has worked pretty well since it was started. Mistakes have been made, of course, but afaik they were based on bad economics, not politics.

Making the Fed more political, especially now, seems like a bad idea.