[scheeseman486]

> the answer is "it's insecure".

Can you give me a quote where they outright say this? Because my hunch is that what they actually say is something along the lines of 'because it doesn't have the security requirements that we desire' which would be true. Whatever their reasons for those choices, it also makes sense to limit scope given the extreme constraints they're working under and that scope is best limited to phones with the widest security feature support for their security-focus Android OS.

> Are you calling the above a "character attack"?

Grow up.

[Ghoelian]

'because it doesn't have the security requirements that we desire'

aka, insecure.

[pessimizer]

I am continually puzzled that sometimes people can't put together a denial without including an affirmation as a crucial part of that denial. It's like they're doing the opposite of question-begging, they're saying that you're wrong because you're right.

[scheeseman486]

No, those don't mean the same thing.

All phones are insecure to some extent, most phones compared to GrapheneOS/Pixels are less secure and this has largely proven out whenever there's been leaks of the capabilities of law enforcement phone cracking tools.

[fsflover]

I just don't see how it refutes any of my arguments. See the example of Qubes OS in my above reply.

[scheeseman486]

QubesOS is an OS for PCs which have a standardized hardware interface. Support for older systems is basically "free". Smartphones aren't standardized in the same way and the amount of effort it takes to properly support other phones has a considerably higher cost on developer bandwidth.

Anyone can fork GrapheneOS and build it for other phones if they want, instead of doing this the developers instead focus their time and effort on the most suitable hardware for their needs. This isn't a part of some agenda or a swipe at Linux, open source or Stallman's cholesterol filled heart, it's just pragmatism.

[strcat]

GrapheneOS has to do substantial work on each supported device to integrate the hardening features and fix the issues those uncover. Supporting other devices is not easy and involves a lot of resources. Those devices also need to provide the hardware-based features heavily used by GrapheneOS including hardware memory tagging, pointer authentication, verified boot, etc. which those devices don't provide.

[fsflover]

Can you support these devices without listed features with a low effort?

[fsflover]

I agree that the lack of resources is a reasonable argument. However this not the argument provided: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30765013

[scheeseman486]

Instead there's a bunch of other arguments that are just as reasonable which underline why deploying their security focused OS on such a hardware platform would be a waste of their time. This is your refutation?

It really seems like you're more concerned about hurt feelings than objective fact here. Every link you've provided thus far was framed by you as evidence of poor decisions or behaviour on the part of the GrapheneOS team but you've done nothing to elaborate, and after reading the content of those links for myself there is nothing there that support the things you've been implying.

It doesn't make a whole lot of sense, at least not unless I put myself into the mindset of a child and read any negativity expressed towards FOSS projects as an attack, or taking their choice to not target phones I like personally.

[strcat]

See the relevant part of the response in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45229295.