[lemonwaterlime]

My take is that the GP was implicitly referring to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems with the implication being that a system that reasons completely about all the human topics and itself is not possible. Therefore, you’d need multiple such systems (plural) working in concert.

[eru]

That doesn't make much sense.

If you take multiple systems and make them work in concert, you just get a bigger system.

[jijijijij]

> If you take multiple systems and make them work in concert, you just get a bigger system.

The conclusion may be wrong, but a "bigger system" can be larger than the sum of its constituents. So a system can have functions, give rise to complexity, neither of its subsystems feature. An example would be the thinking brain, which is made out of neurons/cells incapable of thought, which are made out of molecules incapable of reproduction, which are made from atoms incapable of catalyzing certain chemical reactions and so on.

[svnt]

This is just emergence, though? How is emergence related to completeness?

This happens over and over with the relatively new popularization of a theory: the theory is proposed to be the solution to every missing thing in the same rough conceptual vector.

It takes a lot more than just pointing in the general direction of complexity to propose the creation of a complete system, something which with present systems of understanding appears to be impossible.

[jijijijij]

> How is emergence related to completeness?

I didn't make that argument. I think, the original conclusion above isn't reasonable. However, "a concert" isn't "just" a bigger system either, which is my point.

[svnt]

It just depends on your definition of system, doesn’t it?

[CuriouslyC]

Sort of, the guardrail here IMO is you have an ontology processor that basically routes to a submodule, and if there isn't a submodule present it errors out. It is one large system, but it's bounded by an understanding of its own knowledge.

[tossandthrow]

Concerts - again plural. And naturally you only bring in appropriate instruments.

[svnt]

Turtles all the way down?

[Jeff_Brown]

A collection of systems is itself a system. The theorem would not recognize the distinction.

[jijijijij]

I believe, neither the expansion of Gödel's theorems to "everything", non-formalized systems, nor the conclusion of a resolution by harnessing multiple systems in concert, are sound reasoning. I think, it's a fallacious reductionism.

[tossandthrow]

What is a non-formalized system?

I am very curious on this. In particular, if you are able to split systems into formalized and non formalized, then I thinks there are quite some praise and a central spot in all future history books for you!

[jijijijij]

I am not a native speaker, so please don't get hung up on particular expressions.

I meant, the colloquial philosophies and general ontology are not subject of Gödel's work. I think, the forgone expansion is similar to finding evidence for telepathy in the pop-sci descriptions of quantum entanglement. Gödel's theorems cover axiomatic, formal systems in mathematics. To apply it to whatever, you first have to formalize whatever. Otherwise, it's an intuition/speculation, not sound reasoning. At least, that's my understanding.

Further reading: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_th...

[alisonkisk]

The person you were replying to is not a native speaker either, and also is not knowledgeable about the core ideas of logical systems (as other commenters have already explained).