[btilly]

I would call it a somewhat incorrect understanding.

They do a lot of their investing in out of the money options. Those are investments that cost very little to make, which will make a lot of money if something very unlikely happens. (You can make these investments on both sides - both up and down.) Lots of people are willing to take the opposing side of the bet based on standard models. If those standard models are significantly underestimating the risk of unusual things happening, then in the long run the black swan strategy will make money.

Since by definition you don't know where a black swan will happen, you also need to spread your investments out across many places. But you don't just diversify, you diversify across very specific classes of investments that are very cheap to make and have a very low probability of paying off.

In the startup analogy you'd want to diversify across as many startups as possible, and invest in them as early as you can.

[ggggx]

Seems to me none of you guys have the correct understanding of what Spitznagel does at his Universa. He actually uses these out of the money options payoffs not to bet on random black swans, but rather to exploit really big moves that he is actually counting on (apparently based on bs understanding of Austrian economics). All this black swan talk was BS afterall. He says... "black swan events have been largely insignificant in at least the last century of capital investment in the U.S., including the current crisis. Investors have indeed encountered surprising and pernicious events, but the fact is those who were surprised have essentially been those (in the extreme majority) with a brazen disregard for the central concepts of Austrian capital theory and monetary credit expansions." in his paper "The Austrians and the Swan: Birds of a Different Feather" here http://www.universa.net/UniversaSpitznagel_research_201205.p...