[dvno42]

So what was the actual point of compromise? Was it a CALEA supporting software vendor? My guess is a common MD (Mediator device) vendor was targeted that was used by many carriers but that's speculation on my part.

Context for others, there's a small number of software vendors that make these MD devices that handle initiating a capture of a flow (a wiretapping request) and managing the chain of custody for a pcap. MDs usually sends an SNMP poll to a router/switch to start a (r)span port and the MD device slurps up all data and saves it.

Anyway, what I'm curious about is if it's the MDs that were taken over and if it was one manufacturer but I'm not seeing much technical info on all these reports.

Here's some context for "LI" for those interested: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst9...

[michael1999]

The simple answer is that CALEA requires all traffic to be effectively in plain text. Once you impose that constraint, any decent router exploit gives you everything.

[aftbit]

Most protocols that I use day-to-day are secure against simple passive interception. Either SSH or TLS encrypts just about every packet that leaves my network. This got much better with DNS over HTTPS (or TLS before that). Of course these protocols are sometimes susceptible to downgrade attacks, man in the middle compromises, etc, but none of that would be available to someone who was running a pcap without modifying the traffic streams.

So how would a simple MD attack affect me? Any sort of CALEA attack on a higher protocol layer (e.g. compromising Gmail at Google instead of capturing their traffic) would make sense, but not a pcap.

[michael1999]

That’s what makes CALEA so toxic. Any covered comms must be effectively-plain-text, or it doesn’t work. Once you impose a plain-text architecture, a mass-breach is inevitable.

[dvno42]

Definitely, I would hope these kinds of systems become less useful with more encryption. I imagine, these kinds of collections I mentioned above are just one of many angles used in an investigation with this particular angle being for correlation and supporting evidence against a request to bookface, cloudflare, etc.

edit these network devices probably also carry voip/voice trunks from enterprise and possibly carriers such as VZW. No telling if those are encrypted or not. If China is able to tap that using these CALEA systems, I could see how that would be a big deal for stealing IP/secrets.

[michael1999]

No. That’s what makes CALEA so damaging. It is ILLEGAL to encrypt covered traffic in a way that isn’t intercept-able by any random sheriff’s office in any county of the USA.

[shrubble]

As far as I know, all telecommunications companies in the USA do not encrypt phone calls in the core of their networks; they may have TLS to/from the customers to the SBC (session border controller, a firewall/terminating point for customers), but once it’s past that point, it’s all sent in the clear.

[esseph]

SMS TOTP

Header decryption data (protocol, source, target)

Any phone calls

Etc.

[EE84M3i]

I thought this campaign targeted telephony networks (SMS, voice), not IP networks?

[esseph]

No, ISPs, many (most) of which are traditional telcos.