[nathan_compton]

He is a philosopher. I'm a physicist and I've read his book and I found it interesting. Don't know what to tell you.

Most physicists don't know all that much about the philosophical underpinnings of their discipline, so I'd rather see what philosophers have to say about it anyway. But that isn't the point. I'm saying I thought the book was well put together and thought provoking, though I don't think his argument goes through. If that interests you, read it. If you prefer to let an arbitrary label filter out whose ideas you might entertain, I guess go for it.

[the_af]

Oh, no, you got me wrong. I was curious about his credentials, but this doesn't mean I don't find philosophy intriguing and fascinating. I would say humanity cannot exist without philosophy. Thinking about ourselves, thinking about knowledge, thinking about what we believe about knowledge, thinking about what is and what is not, thinking about thinking -- all of these are essential.

It's just that it matters to me whether it's a philosopher who's arguing about the physical properties of the universe or a physicist.

I do think you care a bit about labels and what they stand for, after all your first post didn't fail to mention you're a physicist!

[nathan_compton]

I think our confusion comes from the fact that from where I am standing there is not a lot of difference between philosophers and physicists because I'm mostly thinking about philosophers who are philosophers of physics or in adjacent fields.

[the_af]

I understand you're discussing philosophers engaged in epistemology, which are some of the philosophers closer to science.

I think epistemology is critical and necessary. It fascinates me. However, I wouldn't class them as physicists (unless they actually are, of course; you can wear more than one hat).

I admit I'm not familiar with Deacon, but Wikipedia states he's a "neuroanthropologist". I wonder how he would feel about a physicist making authoritative statements on neurobiology or anthropology!

This trap is not hypothetical. Remember when Michael Behe sided with Creationism and Intelligent Design, using his credentials as a scientist to try to discredit the theory of evolution? But he wasn't a scientist trained in that field, nor was he qualified to comment on it. He was a biochemist!

(I hope we've established labels do matter, insofar as they mean the person so labeled is immersed and has demonstrated high qualifications in the labeled field).

[nathan_compton]

I guess what I am sort of getting at is that no amount of trusting labels to delineate intellectuals will protect you from having to actually look at something and decide whether the person has something useful or interesting to say or not.

In this particular discussion I don't particularly care whether some Joe Schmoe on the street trusts or doesn't trust Terrance Deacon on the basis of what his degree says. It doesn't matter.

And I actually think your example of Michael Behe works towards my point of view. Credentials are a very weak signal of expertise on any subject, as he demonstrates. I think at the basic level of philosophy of science or physics or whatever, the idea that we can break up disciplines into clear chunks is just silly. At some point a serious intellectual just has to do the work for themselves to digest the ideas. I'd be worse off if I had skipped Deacon's book (which, incidentally and again, I don't think really lands) if I had skipped it because he didn't have a PhD that matched mine.

[the_af]

> I guess what I am sort of getting at is that no amount of trusting labels to delineate intellectuals will protect you from having to actually look at something and decide whether the person has something useful or interesting to say or not.

I actually agree with this! I'm sure Deacon has interesting things to say. And yes, I can only find out about it by reading him, not by reading Wikipedia's summary -- or you.

Michael Behe didn't have the right kind of credentials: he was speaking outside his area of expertise, as was noted repeatedly during that debacle. He co-opted the mantle of capital-letter Science and misused it to maliciously confuse his audience.

> I think at the basic level of philosophy of science or physics or whatever, the idea that we can break up disciplines into clear chunks is just silly.

Of course all distinctions are man-made and therefore arbitrary. Yet you have a doctorate in Physics, and not in Neuroanthropology. At a fundamental level, you understood if Physics interested you, there was a path for you which was this path and not that other path. The border might be fuzzy, but at some level you understand not all regions are equivalent.

> At some point a serious intellectual just has to do the work for themselves to digest the ideas. I'd be worse off if I had skipped Deacon's book (which, incidentally and again, I don't think really lands) if I had skipped it because he didn't have a PhD that matched mine.

I fully agree and I'm not arguing anyone should skip Deacon (or anyone else) because they are not physicists. I just wouldn't pay the same attention to a Physics lecture by someone whose expertise doesn't lie in Physics (or to an anthropology lecture by a physicist who's not also an anthropologist). Doesn't mean I would necessarily skip it though!

I also understand you're not saying Deacon is right. Sufficiently interesting ideas are worth considering regardless of whether they are right. I don't think Julian Jaynes is right either, yet I consider "The Origin of Consciousness" an extremely interesting book!

I'm not sure how many times I have to explain I consider philosophy, epistemology and -- I'll say it -- the humanities essential? I'm not arguing about skipping anything!

[nathan_compton]

I think we kind of agree. Obviously no one has enough time to personally vet every single claimant to expertise, so we use credentials to help. But I think in this particular context Deacon's specific credentials aren't really that relevant, at least to the extent that I'm vouching for him and that might (but I guess who am I, right) obviate the need to rely on his specific credentials.