[moduspol]

Well I mean there's no inherent requirement that PKI work the way it does. We've mostly just accepted it because it's good enough.

Even if your server admins fully understand TLS, there are still issues like clock skew on clients breaking things, old cipher suites needing to be reviewed / sunset, users clicking past certificate warnings despite training, and the list of (sometimes questionable) globally trusted CAs that the security of the Internet depends upon.

Of course they should do their job properly, but I'm skeptical that we (as software developers) can't come up with something that can more reliably work well.

[FuriouslyAdrift]

Yeah I have one specific enterprise app (the updater service for another piece of software) that will not work unless TLS 1.1 is turned on at the OS level. It doesn't do anything with it, but some hard coded phone-home function in the software must fire up each time it checks for updates (even though it doesn't use TLS for the connection, but unencrypted FTP) or it will hard fail and not even log the failure.