[The_Fox]

Their own tools would need the various API keys, of course, and they did build a method to filter out those variables and managed most user code through it, but it sounds like they forgot to put Rubocop through the special method.

So this researcher may have gotten lucky in choosing to dig into the tool that CodeRabbit got unlucky in forgetting.

[chuckadams]

It sounds like a pretty bad approach in general to have to "filter out the bad stuff" on a case-by-case basis. It should be as simple as launching everything from a sanitized parent environment, and making it impossible to launch any tool otherwise. Or better, make that sanitized environment the default and make privileged operations be the thing that jumps through hoops to talk to a bastion/enclave/whatever that holds the actual keys.

[The_Fox]

Yes although somewhere there will be an `if` statement to determine if the process being started should get the complete environment or a key to get the other keys or whatever. Best to make that `if` at the highest level of the architecture as possible and wrapped in something that makes it obvious, like a `DangerousUserCodeProcess` class.

The only other safety I can think of is a whitelist, perhaps of file pathnames. This helps to maintain a safe-by-default posture. Taking it further, the whitelist could be specified in config and require change approval from a second team.