[pmarreck]

It still arguably complies with the Paradox of Tolerance.

Terrorists (as well as their supporters) are intolerant and non-pluralist. Therefore, for a pluralist society to survive, it must be intolerant of one thing- intolerance.

[xg15]

The paradox of tolerance isn't wrong, but it's also invoked awfully quickly in the last years, often by people who weren't tolerant to begin with.

I'd at least like to know who defines who is a "Pluralist" and who is a "Terrorist".

Also: The paradox of tolerance can legitimately be used to call intolerant behaviors of individuals. When you use it to define entire population groups as "intolerant", and therefore not worth of protection, you have joined the side that you ostensibly want to fight against.

[throwaway290]

You can define who is tolerant and who is not literally from the definition of the word. It's not a problem.

> When you use it to define entire population groups as "intolerant"

There are suitable cases, eg. if you are in jihad or other extremist sect where part of ideology is intolerance

[pmarreck]

> When you use it to define entire population groups as "intolerant", and therefore not worth of protection, you have joined the side that you ostensibly want to fight against.

Suppose there was an organization that had written by-laws which were not permitted to be changed but which demanded adherence (on pain of death), including never leaving the organization. Also suppose that most of the members of that organization collectively decided not to adhere to all of its rules (some were considered incompatible with "progress")... but some continued to. And others sometimes began to, but only under stress, because the by-laws book (which, again, cannot be changed, on pain of death) made NO clarification on scope of application, and people were free to interpret the by-laws literally.

Why would you not judge that organization, given that its by-laws are its core? Why would you make special exceptions for ANY organization (or its members), here?

I mean, objectively-speaking, if we weren't reflexively defending the org we're of course discussing, it sounds like a dystopian science-fiction novel. (If I'm being honest, it sounds A LOT like Warhammer, actually.)

Here's a fun thing to read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naskh_(tafsir)

"With few exceptions, Islamic revelations do not state which Quranic verses or hadith have been abrogated, and Muslim exegetes and jurists have disagreed over which and how many hadith and verses of the Quran are recognized as abrogated, with estimates varying from less than ten to over 500."

Also note that naskh tends to recognize later passages as overriding earlier passages. Guess which ones are the more violent ones...

See a problem, yet? Please don't gaslight me into not seeing one.

[HPsquared]

"Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."

[pmarreck]

Exceptions are hypocrisy, by definition.

If you need exceptions, abandon the rule, because it is no longer a rule, it is just a discriminatingly applied proscription.

[Saline9515]

Who decides who is considered “tolerant” and who isn’t? This idea is ripe for manipulation and will end up producing the opposite of what was intended.

[waterhouse]

To be sure, in the original context of Popper's writing, I believe "intolerant" meant something like "committing violence against others for disagreeing with you", and "tolerate" meant "refrain from intolerance". The full quote is below:

"Less well known [than other paradoxes] is the paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal."

[cma]

> I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force;

Sounds like speech suppression with force because (later in the quote) the speech may later give way to force. If he was only talking about force in response to force it wouldn't be considered a paradox I don't think. This quote hasn't dispeled popular characterizations of his stance for me, it seems in line with what most people say he's saying.

[waterhouse]

As you say, it's because the speech may later give way to force. It does go farther than American free speech law permits: the latter draws the line at something like "threats of immediate criminal action", whereas this would attack "propagating ideologies that one thinks will eventually lead the followers to criminal action". There are certainly deep problems with potential implementation here: e.g. the main American political parties would probably both accuse each other's ideology of eventually leading the followers to criminal action. One would want high standards for that (of, say, what percentage engage in what magnitude of criminal action; as well as evidentiary standards), and want it to be established in a mega-trial, or by a supermajority of Congress declaring war on an ideology; and even that might not be enough. I'm not necessarily in favor of Popper's approach, except in emergencies.

However, I think that, when most people use the word "intolerance" today, they include things like speaking racial slurs or expressing any negative emotion towards a demographic group. There are contexts in which these things are done, and manners in which they are done, in which, yes, they do give a significant signal that the speaker is the type who would cheerfully escalate to aggressive violence towards the targeted group; but also contexts and manners in which they do not give such a signal.

I think there is a distinction to be drawn here, between "always tracking whether this is likely to escalate to criminal action" and "just attacking anyone who vaguely resembles a known 'intolerant' group". The latter is essentially an autoimmune disorder, which has led to massive collateral damage and its own discrediting. The former ... has a danger of turning into the latter, certainly (which has an interestingly meta angle to it), but is there any version of it that is well-protected against that fate? I expect there's room for improvement compared to earlier versions. I don't know if it can be done well enough to be worthwhile.

[cma]

I think we can have stronger protections in the US, while keeping it within existing frameworks. Why is it constitutionally ok to give mega corporations strong protections against slander backed by the state who will enforce the ruling, but protection of ethnic groups from slander is constitutionally off limits? It doesn't follow from the constitution.

[nradov]

Huh? Have you even read the Constitution? This has nothing to do with slander.

[graemep]

No, we need to be intolerant of people who threaten others freedom. It does not require preventing them from expressing intolerant views. It means preventing them from actively trying to harm or intimidate others - e.g. making threats, becoming actually violent etc.

[mystraline]

The paradox of tolerance disappears if you look at tolerance not as a moral standard, but as a social contract.

If someone does not abode by the terms of the contract, they are not covered by it.

In other words, the intolerant are not following the rules of the social contract of mutual tolerance.

Since they have broken the terms of the contract, they are no longer covered by the contract, and their intolerance will NOT be tolerated.

[HPsquared]

Aka the "fundamental contradiction of liberalism".

[gregorygoc]

It’s basic game theory. If someone is not nice to you, you have to be not nice for them.

[zuminator]

Are you talking about the tit-for-tat strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma? That's a particular toy model with an exaggeratedly punitive payoff matrix. But not every daily interaction can be reasonably mapped onto that matrix. A random interaction with a brusque stranger in a queue isn't necessarily going to result in a good outcome for your being rude ('defecting') in a tit-for-tat. If anything it might cause you more stress and embarrassment than if you'd remained mum.

[thefaux]

I can't tell if this is serious or not, but I strongly disagree with this advice if it is.