[duped]

What's the threat model where a malicious message sender has write access to shared memory

[kragen]

When you are using the shared memory to communicate with an untrusted sender. Examples might include:

- browser main processes that don't trust renderer processes

- window system compositors that don't trust all windowed applications, and vice versa

- database servers that don't trust database clients, and vice versa

- message queue brokers that don't trust publishers and subscribers, and vice versa

- userspace filesystems that don't trust normal user processes

[hmry]

How would someone send a message over shared memory without write access to that memory?

[IshKebab]

I think he meant what's the scenario where you're using IPC via shared memory and don't trust both processes. Basically it only applies if the processes are running as two different users. (I think Android does that a lot?)