[A_D_E_P_T]

Even if we grant that China is anything like Iraq (it sure ain't!), that was more than 20 years ago.

Last year, and not for want of trying, the US Navy sure didn't do anything to destroy the Houthi's conventional military capabilities. They're still sinking ships left and right! So much for freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas.

> https://edition.cnn.com/world/middleeast/eternity-c-houthi-r...

Now imagine the USN actually has to fight a war in shallow waters against a foe that's literally 10,000x better armed and equipped than the Houthis, and with a capacity for industrial production that dwarfs its own.

War is a measuring rod. Before it begins, each side guesses at its own strength and the other's will. Often it guesses wrong. (In Ukraine, NATO overrated its weapons and tactics, Russia both overrated its own capabilities, and underrated Ukraine's resolve.) But if both sides know the truth beforehand, they don't fight to begin with. Thus there's literally zero chance that there's a war between the US and China in 2027, because the outcome is not really in doubt.

[XorNot]

What conventional military capabilities? The Houthi's aren't sinking military ships, they're sinking unarmed, unarmored freighters in a stretch of water so narrow you could use a towed artillery gun to bullseye a freighter moving through it.

The problem they're facing is they can't reduce that capability to zero without starting a half-dozen other wars to deal with a logistical supply chain.

[A_D_E_P_T]

Military capabilities: The anti-ship missiles, drones, fast attack craft, etc. that the Houthis have and continue to use offensively.

> https://news.usni.org/2025/07/29/houthis-to-target-ships-in-...

As for "they can't reduce that capability to zero," the CFR made the same point a little while back: https://www.cfr.org/blog/houthis-have-defeated-us-navy-or-wh...

But it was turned around and reframed a little bit, where the inability of the USN to achieve anything tangible represents an absolute failure on their part. This is a more sober and credible read of the situation. If your tool doesn't work, what good is it? And if you think that the same tool is up for the job of fighting in the South China Sea, it seems to me that you ought to reassess your opinion. Expeditionary naval forces don't work very well these days. (Something that Russia also learned in the Black Sea.)

[XorNot]

The Houthis somewhat inconveniencing global shipping in a protracted conflict defined by "our available missiles are too expensive to be using against the targets being sent against us" and the US defending Taiwan from a seaborne land invasion which would require the bulk transit of men, vehicles and supplies across a narrow body of water are in no way equivalent scenarios.

The Houthis aren't invading or occupying anything they didn't already own. No one is trying to take it from them. They are an insurance risk.

China trying to invade and occupy Taiwan is an existential threat for the people of Taiwan, and the volume and value of materials and men China would have to move across the Strait of Taiwan would vastly exceed the value of the missiles which would be targeted against them (and in fact would be targeted more aggressively since the US in part avoids expending missiles so as to retain reserves against more serious opponents - in a straight up fight with China though, you'd be much more liberal in your targeting priorities), which is what the US Navy is built to do. A platform being vulnerable to some new tactic does not make the platform useless, and if a minor upgrade would fix it then it just means you're in a transition point. If laser-equipped American destroyers with fleets of mixed capability interceptor UAVs in 2 years time are ensuring nothing touches a ship in the Red Sea, your theory would be in immense trouble - and that technology isn't theoretical, it's being deployed right now.

But perhaps if you really want to consider the problem, then just take a look at what China is building: missile destroyers, submarines, aircraft carriers and stealth fighters. If all these things are so worthless and could not fight and defeat China, then why is China spending so much money trying to exactly replicate those capabilities if the future is all drones all the time or whatever other internet sensation of the moment (i.e. a year back when "the end of the tank was nigh" according to the internet).

[A_D_E_P_T]

> But perhaps if you really want to consider the problem, then just take a look at what China is building: missile destroyers, submarines, aircraft carriers and stealth fighters. If all these things are so worthless and could not fight and defeat China, then why is China spending so much money trying to exactly replicate those capabilities if the future is all drones all the time or whatever other internet sensation of the moment.

Because: One of their best opening moves is a blockade of Taiwan, and that requires naval assets.

And because: There is such a thing as hedging your bets. No matter what anybody thinks, it is unwise to bet everything on your missile forces or new drones. You don't want to overcommit to one strategy or one way of waging war and later realize that you need to fall back on older means and methods. (As experienced by the Russians in 2022-2023.) So building a navy may be nothing more than a hedge against the possibility that other ways of making war won't work out.

But there's really no avoiding the fact that mobile launchers like the DF21/26/41 can launch a small LEO SAR constellation (i.e. just a few satellites) and a few ~10 minute contacts per day would provide enough targeting data to pinpoint any US surface fleet in the western Pacific. It's easy to see how a sufficient volume of missiles removes them from the board.

As an aside:

> If laser-equipped American destroyers

It's almost laughably easy to harden drones and missiles to high-power lasers. You can even retrofit old ones. Various different methods have been known since the 1970s. Lasers might work against trash-tier weapons and DJI drones, but the minute they become common on the battlefield countermeasures will become ubiquitous.