[Karrot_Kream]

To me this seems outlandish (e.g. if you're part of PRISM you know what's happening and you're forced to comply.) But to think through this threat model, you're worried that the NSA will tap intra-DC traffic but not that it will try to install software or hardware on your hosts to spy traffic at the NIC level? I guess it would be harder to intercept and untangle traffic at the NIC level than intra-DC, but I'm not sure?

[viraptor]

> you're worried that the NSA will tap intra-DC traffic but not that it will try to install software or hardware on your hosts

It doesn't have to be one or the other. We've known for over a decade that the traffic between DCs was tapped https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/30/google-re... Extending that to intra-DC wouldn't be surprising at all.

Meanwhile backdoored chips and firmware attacks are a constant worry and shouldn't be discounted regardless of the first point.

[heavyset_go]

> (e.g. if you're part of PRISM you know what's happening and you're forced to comply.)

Only a handful of people need to know what happens in Room 641A, and they're compelled or otherwise incentivized not to let anyone else know.

[codedokode]

> you're worried that the NSA will tap intra-DC traffic but not that it will try to install software or hardware on your hosts to spy traffic at the NIC level

It might not be able to, if you use secure boot and your server is locked in a cage.

[adgjlsfhk1]

The difference between tapping intra-DC and in computer spying is that in computer spying is much more likely to get caught and much less easily able to get data out. There's a pretty big difference between software/hardware weaknesses that require specific targeting to exploit and passive scooping everything up and scanning