[miltonlost]

It's not a confusing piece if you don't skip/ignore the first part. You're using her one example and removing the portion about how human beings learn and how AI is actively removing that process. The incident resolution is an example of her general point.

[tptacek]

I feel pretty comfortable with how my comment captures the context of the whole piece, which of course I did read. Again: what's weird about this is that the first part would be pretty coherent and defensible if applied to coding agents (some people will want to work the way she spells out, especially earlier in their career, some people won't), but doesn't make as much sense for the example she uses for the remaining 2/3rds of the piece.

[JoshTriplett]

It makes perfect sense for that case too. If you let AI do the whole job of incident handling (and leaving aside the problem where they'll get it horribly wrong), that also has the same problem of breaking the processes by which people learn. (You could make the classic "calculator" vs "long division" argument here, but one difference is, calculators are reliable.)

Also:

> some people will want to work the way she spells out, especially earlier in their career

If you're going to be insulting by implying that only newbies should be cautious about AI preventing them from learning, be explicit about it.

[tptacek]

You can simply disagree with me and we can hash it out. The "early career" thing is something Weakly herself has called out.

I disagree with you that incident responders learn best by e.g. groveling through OpenSearch clusters themselves. In fact, I think the opposite thing is true: LLM agents do interesting things that humans don't think to do, and also can put more hypotheses on the table for incident responders to consider, faster, rather than the ordinary process of rabbitholing serially down individual hypothesis, 20-30 minutes at a time, never seeing the forest for the trees.

I think the same thing is probably true of things like "dumping complicated iproute2 routing table configurations" or "inspecting current DNS state". I know it to be the case for LVM2 debugging†!

Note that these are all active investigation steps, that involve the LLM agent actually doing stuff, but none of it is plausibly destructive.

† Albeit tediously, with me shuttling things to and from an LLM rather than an agent doing things; this sucks, but we haven't solved the security issues yet.

[JoshTriplett]

The only mention I see of early-career coming up in the article is "matches how I would teach an early career engineer the process of managing an incident". That isn't a claim that only early career engineers learn this way or benefit from working in this style. Your comment implied that the primary people who might want to work in the way proposed in this article are those early in their career. I would, indeed, disagree with that.

Consider, by way of example, the classic problem of teaching someone to find information. If someone asks "how do I X" and you answer "by doing Y", they have learned one thing (and will hopefully retain it). If someone asks "how do I X" and you answer "here's the search I did to find the answer of Y", they have now learned two things, and one of them reinforces a critical skill they should be using throughout their career.

I am not suggesting that incident response should be done entirely by hand, or that there's zero place for AI. AI is somewhat good at, for instance, looking at a huge amount of information at once and pointing towards things that might warrant a closer look. I'm nonetheless agreeing with the point that the human should be in the loop to a large degree.

That also partly addresses the fundamental security problems of letting AI run commands in production, though in practice I do think it likely that people will run commands presented to them without careful checking.

> none of it is plausibly destructive

In theory, you could have a safelist of ways to gather information non-destructively. In practice, it would not surprise me at all if pople don't. I think it's very likely that many people will deploy AI tools in production and not solve any of the security issues, and incidents will result.

I am all for the concept of having a giant dashboard that collects and presents any non-destructive information rapidly. That tool is useful for a human, too. (Along with presenting the commands that were used to obtain that information.)

[tptacek]

Previous writing, Josh, and I'm done now litigating whether I wrote the "early career" thing in bad faith and expect you to be too.

I don't see you materially disagreeing with me about anything. I read Weakly to be saying that AI incident response tools --- the main focus of her piece --- should operate with hands tied behind their back, delegating nondestructive active investigation steps back to human hands in order to create opportunities for learning. I think that's a bad line to draw. In fact, I think it's unlikely to help people learn --- seeing the results of investigative steps all lined up next to each other and synthesized is a powerful way to learn those techniques for yourself.

[jpc0]

I’m going to but in here.

I think the point the article is making is to observe the patterns humans (hopefully good ones) follow to resolve issues and build paths to make that quicker.

So at first the AI does almost nothing, it observes that in general the human will search for specific logs. If it observes that behaviour enough it then, on its own or through a ticket, builds a Ui flow that enables that behaviour. So now it doesn’t search the log but offers a button to search the log with some prefilled params.

The human likely wanted to perform that action and it has now become easier.

This reinforces good behaviour if you don’t know the steps usually followed and doesn’t pigeonhole someone into an action plan if it is unrelated.

Is this much much harder, yes it is than just building an agent that does X. But it’s a significantly better tool because it doesn’t have humans lose the ability to reason about the process. It just makes them more efficient.

[mattmanser]

I know you carry on to have a good argument down thread, but why do you feel the first part defensible?

The author's saying great products don't come from solo devs. Linux? Dropbox? Gmail? Ruby on Rails? Python? The list is literally endless.

But the author then claims that all great products come from committee? I've seen plenty of products die by committee. I've never seen one made by it.

Their initial argument is seriously flawed, and not at all defensible. It doesn't match reality.

[tptacek]

I just don't want to engage with it; I'm willing to stipulate those points. I'm really fixated on the strange example Weakly used to demonstrate why these tools shouldn't actually do things, but instead just whisper in the ears of humans. Like, you can actually make that argument about coding! I don't agree, but I see how the argument goes. I don't see how it makes any sense at all for incident response.

[jakelazaroff]

I know the "what you refer to as Linux is, in fact, GNU/Linux" thing has become a sort of tongue-in-cheek meme, but it actually applies here: crediting Linus Torvalds alone for the success of Linux ignores crucial contributions from RMS, Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie and probably dozens or hundreds of others.

Ruby on Rails? Are we talking about the Ruby part (Matz) or the Rails part (DHH)?

Dropbox was founded by Drew Houston and Arash Ferdowsi. The initial Gmail development team had multiple people plus the infrastructure and resources of Google. I'm not sure why people love the lone genius story so much, but it's definitely the exception and not the rule.