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by ocdtrekkie
333 days ago
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I do see your position re: passwords tend to successfully be canceled and certificates tend to not. But I would certainly argue that the downsides of rotation on user behavior and technical security design are quite costly. They remove a lot of the opportunity for risk-based authentication (like TOFU) and require people set up fragile automations capable of generating keys that claim to be them. And every certificate warning that isn't due to a real security problem creates alert fatigue that makes certificate errors seen as spurious. I think short certificate lifetimes will be viewed in the relatively short future as misguided as the old NIST recommendation on passwords. |
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To understand the distinction, imagine a password system where you can't change your password. You can make new ones, but the old ones still work. That's the problem TLS was facing.