[sedatk]

Basically, any path longer than 256 characters for `mapFilename` would cause a buffer overrun.

An unprivileged app could run your app (say, with more privileges), with a very long `HOME` environment path, causing a buffer overflow, and potentially exploit it to use your app's privileges to do more stuff than it was supposed to.

Basically, you should never use strcpy and strcat and but use the secure alternatives like strcpy_s and strcat_s, even when you know the source buffer would never exceed the destination size.

[h2337]

> (say, with more privileges)

Isn't it a moot point if unprivileged app can already run anything with more privileges? In normal operation, connmap requires no special privileges.

[sedatk]

Sure, but since there's no enforced standard for how privileges are configured on a system, there's always the possibility that your app to be the only escape ticket.

You can dismiss that possibility of course. But, as a general habit, it's best to use secure alternatives instead of mulling over probabilities every other line.

As a positive side-effect, the change would make your app not crash on systems with long HOME env paths.:)

[jfyi]

I see you already addressed it but here let me give a scenario.

Say the program was installed and set so the user didn't have privs to modify the executable (so an attacker couldn't just change it to do what they want).

A buffer overflow could allow an attacker to gain control flow of the program and feed bogus data to the user allowing them to scrub their presence from the map.

Also, awesome project!