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by alganet
342 days ago
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I think surveillance is very, very advanced. But the active meddling thing is old tricks. One should consider this combination. You can't lie to some systems, the better strategy is to be honest. You can lie to some systems, but these won't be load bearing, so why do it? I will also observe back. The active meddling thing, when observed in action, is a source of information. It could be lying to me too, predicting that observability is inevitable and camouflaging it. Of course, I could be predicting that as well (and so on). Notice how many interesting scenarios exist even if honesty is considered as a viable strategy in a total surveillance hypothetical situation? |
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Not if it's done right. If one person views a page the old-fashioned way, caches the DOM, and circulates it peer-to-peer, then whoever is weaponizing that content only has one browser fingerprint to work with, despite there being potentially thousands of users that they wish they could profile.
That's far less information to work with than the thousands of individual requests they would otherwise have to scrutinize.
The honest/dishonest distinction only comes down to whether you're going to try to protect the volunteer who grabbed the page to begin with, or whether you're going to expose them to retribution.
As for the systems you can't lie to, those you can replace with more trustworthy alternatives. This is a lot of work but it's better than suggesting that your peers be honest in ways that will harm them.
So to answer your question, no. None of the scenarios where you let your adversary know that you're working against them, and also let them know how to find and harm you, are interesting strategies for combatting surveillance.
Surveillance exists in support of targeted coercion. We should not make a target of the more honest among us. We need to protect those people most of all.