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by ajkjk
357 days ago
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Yeah, but the vexing part is "how can that be true for e.g. N=643 but not N=642"? What happens at whatever number it starts true at? Incidentally, Gödel's theorem eventually comes down to a halting-like argument as well (well, a diagonal argument). There is a presentation of it that is in like less than one page in terms of the halting problem---all of the Gödel-numbering stuff is essentially an antiquated proof. I remember seeing this in a great paper which I can't find now, but it's also mentioned as an aside in this blog post: https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=710 wait jk I found it: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.04569 |
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Usually, "what happens" is that the machines become large enough to represent a form of induction too strong for the axioms to 'reason' about. It's a function of the axioms of your theory, and you can add more axioms to stave it off, but of course you can't prove that your new axioms are consistent without even more axioms.
> There is a presentation of it that is in like less than one page in terms of the halting problem---all of the Gödel-numbering stuff is essentially an antiquated proof.
Only insofar as you can put faith into the Church–Turing thesis to sort out all the technicalities of enumerating and verifying proofs. There still must be an encoding, just not the usual Gödel numbering.