| Indeed. And it's fairly trivial to see that computability isn't the right lens to view intelligence through: The classic Turing test takes place over a finite amount of time. Normally less than an hour, but we can arbitrarily give the interlocutor, say, up to a week. If you don't like the Turing test, then just about any other test interaction we can make the system undergo will conclude below some fixed finite time. After all, humans are generally intelligent, even if they only get a handful of decades to prove it. During that finite time interaction, only a finite amount of interaction will be exchanged. Now in principle a system could have a big old lookup table with all prefixes of all possible interactions as keys, and values are probability distributions for what to send back next (and how long to wait before sending the reply). That table would be finite. And thus following it would be computable. Of course, the table would be more than astronomical in size, and utterly impossible to manifest in our physical universe. But computability is too blunt an instrument to formalise this with. In the real universe, you would need to _compress_ that table somehow, eg in a human brain or perhaps in an LLM or so. And then you need to be able to efficiently uncompress the parts of the table you need to produce the replies. Whether that's possible and how are all questions of complexity theory, not computability. See Scott Aaronson's excellent 'Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity': https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.1791 |