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by harimau777
366 days ago
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I think that may depend on how someone defines intelligence. For example, if intelligence includes the ability to feel emotion or appreciate art, then I think it becomes much more plausible that intelligence is not the same as computation. Of course, simply stating that isn't in of itself a philisophically rigorous argument. However, given that not everyone has training in philosophy and it may not even be possible to prove whether "feeling emotion" can be achieved via computation, I think it's a reasonable argument. |
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I can't prove that you have a subjective experience of feeling emotion, and you can't prove that I do - we can only determine that either one of us acts as if we do.
And so this is all rather orthogonal to how we define intelligence, as whether or not a simulation can simulate such aspects as "actual" feeling is only relevant if the Church-Turing thesis is proven wrong.