[lisper]

I think one can levy a much more specific critique of rationalism: rationalism is in some sense self-defeating. If you are rational you will necessarily conclude that the fundamental dynamic that drives the (interesting parts of) the universe is Darwinian evolution, which is not rational. It blindly selects for reproductive fitness at the expense of all else. If you are a gene, you can probably produce more offspring in an already-industrialized environment by making brains that lean more towards misogyny and sexual promiscuity than gender equality and intellectual achievement.

The real conflict here is between Darwinism and enlightenment ideals. But I have yet to see any self-styled Rationalists take this seriously.

[mettamage]

I always liken this to that we’re all asteroids floating in space. There’s no free will and everything is determined. We just see the whole thing unfold from one conscious perspective.

Emotionally I don’t subscribe to this view. Rationally I do.

My critique for rational people is that they don’t seem to fully take experience into account. It’s assumptions + rationality + experience/data + whatever strong inclinations one has that seems to be the full picture for me.

[Retric]

> no free will

That always seemed like a meaningless argument to me. To an outside observer free will is indistinguishable from a random process over some range of possibilities. You aren’t going to randomly go to sleep with your hand in a fire, there’s some hard coded biology preventing that choice but that only means human behavior isn’t completely random, hardly a groundbreaking discovery.

At the other end we have no issues making an arbitrary decision where there’s no way to predict what the better choice is. So what exactly does free will bring to the table that we’re missing without it? Some sort of mystical soul, well what if that’s also deterministic? Unpredictability is useful in game theory, but computers can get that from a hardware RNG based on quantum processes like radioactive decay, so it doesn’t mean much.

Finally, subjectively the answer isn’t clear so what difference does it make?

[mettamage]

> That always seemed like a meaningless argument to me.

Same as that is not the lived experience. I notice that I care about free choice.

The idea that there's no free will may be a pessimistic outlook to some but to me it's a strictly neutral one. It used to be a bit negative, until I looked more closely that there's a difference between looking at a situation objectively and having a lived experience. When it comes to my inclinations and how I want to live life, lived experience takes precedence.

I don't have my thoughts sharp on it, but I don't think the concept even exists philosophically, but I think that's also what you're getting at. It's a conceptual remnant from the past.

[adastra22]

"Free choice" is the first step towards the solution to this paradox: free will is what a deterministic choice feels like from the inside. The popular notion of free will is that our decisions are undetermined, which must imply that there is a random element to them.

But though that is the colloquial meaning, it doesn't line up with what people say they want: you want to make your choice according to your own reasons. You want free choice. But unless your own reasoning includes a literal throw of the dice, your justifications deterministically decide the outcome.

"Free will" is the ability to make your own choices, and for most people most of the time, those choices are deterministic given the options and knowledge available. Free will and determinism are not only compatible, but necessarily so. If your choices weren't deterministic, it wouldn't be free will.

[vidarh]

This is the position that is literally called compatibilist.

But when you probe people, while a lot of people will argue in ways that a philosopher might call compatibilist, my experience is that people will also strongly resist the notion that the only options are randomness and determinism. A lot of people have what boils down to a religious belief in a third category that is not merely a combination of those two, but infuses some mysterious third options where they "choose" that they can't explain.

Most of the time, people who believe there is no free will (and can't be), like me, take positions similar to what you described, that - again - a proponent of free will might describe as compatibilist, but sometimes we oppose the term for the reason above: A lot of people genuinely believe in a "third option" for choices are made.

And so there are really two separate debates on free will: Does the "third option" exist or not, and does "compatibilist free will" exist or not. I don't think I've ever met anyone who seriously disagrees that "free will" the way compatibilists define it exists, so when compatibilists get into arguments over this, it's almost always a misunderstanding...

But I have met plenty of people who disagree with the notion that things are deterministic "from the outside".

[vinceguidry]

I'm a regular practitioner of magic, have written essays about it on Quora, and I can identify this mysterious third option as "the universe responding to your needs." You can use any number of religious terms to refer it to, like serendipity and the like, but none of them can capture the full texture of precisely how free will operates.

Approaching this subject from a rational perspective divorces you from subject and makes it impossible to perceive. You have to immerse yourself in it and one way to do that is magical practice. Having direct experience of the universe responding to your actions and mindset eventually makes it absurdly clear that the universe bears intelligence and it's in this intelligence that free will operates.

I'd never thought before now to connect magic this directly to free will. Thanks for the opportunity to think this through! If you're interested in a deeper discussion, happy to jump on a call.

[adastra22]

It is stronger than compatibilism. Compatibilism argues that free will and determinism are orthogonal. The argument I summarized is that free will is and must necessarily imply determinism..

[GoblinSlayer]

Opposing the term gives a wrong result too, as people jump to hard determinism.

[t47477]

I think a reasonable interpretation of the colloquial sense of incompatibilist free will is that people want to be (or have the experience that they are) their own causal origins or prime movers. That they originate an action that is not (purely) the effect of all other actions that have occurred, but in such a way that they decided what that action was.

From the outside, this is indistinguishable from randomness. But from the inside, the difference is that the individual had a say in what the action would be.

Where this tends to get tangled up with notions of a soul, I think, is that one could argue that such a free choice needs some kind of internal state. If not, then the grounds by which the person makes the choice is a combination of something that is fixed and their environment, which then intuitively seems to reduce the free-will process to a combination of determined and random. So the natural thing to do is then to assign the required "being-ness" (or internal state if you will) to a soul.

But there may exist subtle philosophical arguments that sidestep this dilemma. I am not a philosopher: this is just my impression of what commonsense notions of free will mean.

[adastra22]

My point is that from the outside this doesn’t look like randomness at all, unless you are mistaking ignorance of their motives as a random oracle. If you can infer what set of goals drives their decision making, and the decision making process itself (e.g. ADHD brain vs careful considered action) you can very much predict their decisions. Marketing and PR people do this every single day. People don’t behave like random oracles, they behave like deterministic decision makers with complex, partly unknown goals so our predictions of their behavior are not always correct. That’s not the same thing as random.

[vidarh]

People get emotional about free will because if you come to believe there is no free will it makes you question a lot of things that are emotionally difficult.

E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.

Similarly, wealth disparities can't be excused by someone choosing to work harder, because they had no agency in the "decision".

You can still justify some degree of punishment and reward, but a lack of free will changes which justifications are reasonable very substantially.

E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals, and that has emotionally difficult consequences. For example, for non-premeditated murders carried out out of passion rather than e.g. gang crimes, the odds of someone carrying out another is extremely low and the odds that the fear of a long prison sentence is an actual deterrence is generally low, and and so long prison terms are hard to justify once vengeance is off the table.

And so holding on to a belief in free will is easier to a lot of people than the alternative.

My experience is that there are few issues where people so easily get angry than if you suggest we don't have free will once they start thinking through the consequences (and some imagined ones...).

[WA]

If there is no free will, thoughts about free will are predetermined and so is punishment. The punishers don’t have agency either. You seem to say that punishers do have free will, but criminals don’t?

[vidarh]

I didn't say anything about whether free will exists or not, actually. The comment was specifically worded to explain why some people react to coming to believe there is no free will.

But, sure, I personally do not believe in free will. I'm saying there is no rational basis for thinking anyone has free will ever. I'm saying there is no evidence to suggest free will is possible. In fact, I'll go so far as to say that believing in free will is a religious belief with no support.

But that doesn't mean that events does not have effects on what happens next, just that we don't have agency. That an IF ... THEN ... ELSE ... statement is purely deterministic for deterministic inputs does not mean that changing the inputs won't affect the outputs.

If you "choose" to lay down and do nothing because you decide nothing matters because you don't have free will, you will still lose your job and starve. That it wasn't a "true" "free" choice does not change the fact that it has consequences.

One of the consequences of coming to accept that free will is an illusion is that you need to come to terms with what that means for your beliefs about a wide range of things.

Including that vengeance which might seem moral to some extent if the person who did something to you or others had agency suddenly become immoral. But we still have the feelings and impulses. Reconciling that is hard for a lot of people, and so a lot of people in my experience when faced with a claim like the one I made above that we have no free will tend to react emotionally to the idea of the consequences of it.

[dmbche]

Are there deterministic solutions to the three body problem? Or the double pendulum? Or can you tell the t° at any point on earth for say, a millisecond in, say, 6h (feel free to chose a prefered point and time)? And what precision could you realistically produce in that?

If there are non deterministic processes that can be proven to exist, and those interact with deterministic processes, doesn't it follow that the deterministic process becomes non deterministic (since the result of the interaction is necessarily non deterministic), and that it is not continually deterministic.

So - can you see how nothing can be deterministic other than in isolation (or thought experiment really)?

Edit0: typo

[Retric]

That’s more effective as an argument to get rid of the most extreme forms of punishment (eg drawn and quartered) not all forms of retribution.

In a world without free will crimes of passion are simply the result of the situation which means that person would always chose murder in that situation. People who would respond with murder in an unacceptably wide range of situations is an edge case worth consideration without free will. Alternatively if we want nobody to respond with murder in a crime of passion situation evolutionary pressure could eventually work even without free will.

> E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals, and that has emotionally difficult consequences. For example, for non-premeditated murders carried out out of passion rather than e.g. gang crimes, the odds of someone carrying out another is extremely low and the odds that the fear of a long prison sentence is an actual deterrence is generally low, and and so long prison terms are hard to justify once vengeance is off the table.

That’s assuming absolute certainty about what happened. Punishments may make sense as a logical argument even if it’s only useful in a subset of cases if you can’t be absolutely sure which case something happened to be.

Uncertainty does a lot to align emotional heuristics and logical actions.

[zzo38computer]

Whether or not you have free will is not relevant, as I had described in other comments.

> In a world without free will crimes of passion are simply the result of the situation which means that person would always chose murder in that situation. People who would respond with murder in an unacceptably wide range of situations is an edge case worth consideration without free will.

This is a significant argument. However, there is also worth considering if that is actually accurate, and if such a situation will occur (in a case where whoever would be killed would not effectively protect themself from this).

> That’s assuming absolute certainty about what happened. Punishments may make sense as a logical argument even if it’s only useful in a subset of cases if you can’t be absolutely sure which case something happened to be.

It is true that you do not have absolute certainty, but neither should you arrest someone who is not guilty.

> Uncertainty does a lot to align emotional heuristics and logical actions.

In some cases, yes, but it is not always valid. But, even if it is, this does not mean that you should not consider it logically if you are able to do so.

[zzo38computer]

I think that whether or not you have free will is not so important when making these considerations.

Whether or not you have a choice and free will, you can influence and be influenced by other stuff, since that is how anything is doing.

> punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals

I do agree with that, and I think that whether or not you have free will is not significant. Being emotionally difficult is not what makes it good or bad in this case (and it also does not seem to be so emotionally difficult to me, anyways). Reducing reoffending rates is what is important.

(Another issue is knowing if they are actually guilty (you shouldn't arrest people who are not actually guilty of murder); this is not always certain, either.)

I also think that it should mean that prisoners should not be treated badly and that prison sentences should not be too long. (Also, they shouldn't take up too much space by the prisons, since they should have free space for natural lands and for other buildings and purposes, but that is not quite the same issue, though.)

However, there may be cases where a fine might be appropriate, in order to pay for damages (although if someone else is willing to forgive them then such a fine may not be required). This does not justify a prison sentence or stuff like that, though.

Also, some people will just not like them anymore if they are accused of murder, even if they are not put in prison and not fined. This is not the issue for police and legal things; it is just what it will be. And, if it becomes known, people who disagree with the risk assessment can try to avoid someone.

And, if someone does commit a crime again and may have opportunity to do again in future, then this can be considered as being wrong the first time and this time hopefully you can know better.

[aleph_minus_one]

I don't find the consequences very hard to bear:

For example

> E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.

and

> E.g. punishment might still be justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates, but if that is the goal then it is only justified to the extent that it actually achieves those goals

are simply logical to me (even without assuming any lack of free will).

So what is emotionally difficult about this, as you claim?

[zzo38computer]

I agree; they seem logical to me too, whether or not you have free will.

However, it would seem that not everyone believes that, though.

(It is not quite as simple as it might seem, because the situation is not necessarily always that clear, but other than that, I would agree that it is logical and reasonable, that punishment is only justified from the point of view of reducing offending and reoffending rates and only if it actually achieves those goals.)

[vidarh]

Then you're highly unusual (in a good way). Look at the amount of comments on social media with outcries over "too short" sentences for example, and the lack of political support for shortening sentences or improving prison standards.

I'm saying it's emotionally difficult to people because I've had this discussion many times over then last 30+ years and I've seen first hand how most people I have this conversation with tend to get angry and agitated over the prospect of not having moral cover for vengeance.

[aleph_minus_one]

> Then you're highly unusual (in a good way). Look at the amount of comments on social media with outcries over "too short" sentences for example, and the lack of political support for shortening sentences or improving prison standards.

I live in Germany.

When I observe the whole societal and political situation in the USA from the outside, it seems to me that it is rather "two blocks where in each of these there is somewhat an internal consensus regarding a quite some political positions. On the other hand, each of these two blocks is actively fighting the other one."

On the other hand, for Germany, I would claim that the opinions in society rather consist of "lots of very diverse stances (though in contrary to the USA less pronounced on the extreme ends) on a lot of topics that make it hard to reach a larger set of followers or some consensus in a larger group, i.e. in-fighting about all kinds of topics without these positions forming political camps (and the fractions for different opinions can easily change when the topic changes)."

Thus, in the given example, this means for a person out-crying "too short" sentences on social media, you will very likely find one who is out-crying the opposite position.

[mensetmanusman]

“ E.g. punishment for the sake of retribution is near impossible to morally justify if you don't believe in free will because it means you're punishing someone for something the had no agency over.”

False, the punisher also has no will, so it doesn’t matter.

[sunshowers]

I have much less patience for C++ than I would in a world with free will.

Since there's no free will, outcomes are determined by luck, and what matters is how lucky we can make people through pit-of-success environments. Rust makes people luckier than C++ does.

I also have much less patience for blame than I do in a world with free will. I believe, for example, that blameless postmortems lead to much better outcomes than trying to pretend people had free will to make mistakes, and therefore blaming them for those mistakes.

You can get to these positions through means other than rejection of free will, but the most robust grounds for them are fundamentally deterministic.

[tsimionescu]

If there is no free will, then all arguments about what should be done are irrelevant, since every outcome is either predetermined or random, so you have no influence on whether the project at work will choose Rust or C++. This choice was either made 13 billion years ago at the Big Bang, or it is an entirely random process.

[zzo38computer]

> If there is no free will, then all arguments about what should be done are irrelevant, since every outcome is either predetermined or random, so you have no influence on whether the project at work will choose Rust or C++.

This is not correct. Whether or not you have free will, stuff influences and is influenced by other stuff, so these arguments are not meaningless or worthless.

> This choice was either made 13 billion years ago at the Big Bang, or it is an entirely random process.

I had thought of this before, and what I had decided is that both of these are also independent of having free will. For example, if the initial state includes unknown and uncomputable transcendental numbers which can somehow "encode" free will and then the working of physics is deterministic, then it is still possible (although not necessarily mandatory) to have free will, even though it is deterministic.

[Retric]

Lack of free will doesn’t prevent logical arguments from seeming to work.

[GoblinSlayer]

Depends on whether you consider facts or theory. Facts don't prevent logical arguments from seeming to work, but lack of free will is theory. When theory doesn't match facts, theory is wrong.

[mensetmanusman]

Random processes can’t use logic.

[sunshowers]

This is a strawman argument extended by those who rely on supernatural explanations. In reality, people's utterances and actions are part of the environment that determines future actions, just like everything else.

[tsimionescu]

Sure, but that still doesn't matter: the fact that I wrote my previous comment is what caused you to write your response, but it's not like I had a choice to write that comment or some other: the fact that I wrote that comment, as well as everything that led to me writing it (conversations with teachers, my parents letting me watch English cartoons so I learned English, etc), were predetermined the moment the Big Bang happened, or they're just a quantum fluctuation.

What I'm saying is that there's no logical point to the concept "should" unless you have some concept of free will: everything that happens must happen, or is entirely random.

[paleotrope]

Divorced from a religious context, it doesn't make any difference.

[Retric]

Which religious context, and why?

[TheAncientGeek]

Randomness based free will still gives you a non-inevitable future.

[Retric]

So does a computer without free will acting on a physical RNG. Therefore it’s the RNG that matters not free will.

[TheAncientGeek]

For naturalistic libertarians , free.will is.partly constituted by indtermimksm, not something entirely different.

[lisper]

If you get down to the quantum level there is no such thing as objective reality. Our perception that the world is made of classical objects that actually exist at particular places at particular times and have continuity of identity is an illusion. But it's a really compelling illusion, and you won't go far wrong treating it as if it were the truth in 99% of real-world situations. Likewise, free will is an illusion, nothing more than a reflection of our ignorance of how our brains work. But it is a really compelling illusion, and you won't go far wrong treating it as if it were the truth, at least some of the time.

[mettamage]

> If you get down to the quantum level there is no such thing as objective reality.

What do you mean by that? It still exists doesn't it? Albeit in a probabilistic sense that becomes non-probabilistic at larger scales.

I don't know much about quantum other than the high level conceptual stuff.

[lisper]

> It still exists doesn't it?

It's controversial, but here is the argument that the answer is "no": See https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf

Or if you prefer a video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc

[GoblinSlayer]

That's non sequitur.

>Under QIT, a measurement is just the propagation of a mutually entangled state to a large number of particles.

eyeroll so it's MWI in disguise, but MWI is quantum realism. Illusion they talk about is that the observed macroscopic state is a part of the bigger superposition (incomplete observation). But that's dumb, even if it's a part of a bigger state, it's still real, because it's not made up, but observed.

[lisper]

> it's MWI in disguise

That's kind of like saying that GRW is Copenhagen in disguise. It's not wrong, but only because it's making the word "disguise" do some pretty heavy lifting.

> MWI is quantum realism

No, it isn't because it can't account for the Born rule. See:

https://blog.rongarret.info/2019/07/the-trouble-with-many-wo...

[mensetmanusman]

It’s probabilistic at all length scales. For example our solar system may suddenly come undone according to simulations.

[TheAncientGeek]

There is no local realism. That doesn't at all add up to all-in-the-head idealism.

[lisper]

That's true. There is a metaphysical reality "out there", but it is radically different from what we perceive. Hence: an illusion. Note that an illusion is emphatically NOT the same thing as a delusion. Illusions are real sensory experiences common to nearly all humans. They just happen not to correspond to reality.

[lo_zamoyski]

How would you know? If all that's known is either known through the senses or drawn out by reason from what is known through the senses, then by declaring that sense data do not reflect reality, you've cut yourself off form the possibility of knowing reality altogether.

[lisper]

> How would you know?

Because that is the best explanation for what I observe.

> by declaring that sense data do not reflect reality, you've cut yourself off form the possibility of knowing reality altogether

That is true, but only in the uninteresting sense that I can never completely eliminate the possibility that I am living in the Matrix. So yes, it's possible that I'm wrong about the existence of objective reality. But if objective reality is itself an illusion, it's a sufficiently compelling illusion that I'm not going to go far wrong by acting as if it were real.

[TheAncientGeek]

It can't be that different, either, or our senses would be of no practical use.

[lisper]

That's not true. What our senses perceive (classical reality) is an emergent phenomenon of the underlying metaphysical truth (quantum mechanics). Those two things are about as radically different as you can get. That's why the measurement problem is a thing. But that doesn't mean our senses are of no practical use.

[mensetmanusman]

“ There’s no free will and everything is determined.”

Objects without free will aren’t able to come to conclusions like this.

[NoFunPedant]

I'd like to believe that there is no such thing as free will, but I just can't decide.

[dmbche]

Look into Chaos Theory - the universe is not deterministic, you're good.

Or for a tldr look for the three body problem or try to find a solution to a double pendulum!

[stuartjohnson12]

To the contrary, here's a series of essays on the subject of evolutionary game theory, the incentives created by competition, and its consequences for human wellbeing:

https://www.lesswrong.com/s/kNANcHLNtJt5qeuSS

"Moloch hasn't won" is a lengthy critique of the argument you are making here.

[lisper]

That doesn't seem to be on point to me. I'm not talking about being "caught in bad equilibria". My assertion is that rationalism itself is not stable, that the (apparent) triumph of rationalism since the Enlightenment was a transient, not an equilibrium. And one of the reasons it was a transient is that self-styled rationalists believed (and apparently still believe) that rationalism will inevitably triumph because it is rational, because it is in more intimate contact with reality than religion and superstition. But this is wrong because it overlooks the fact that what triumphs in the long run is simply reproductive fitness. Being in contact with reality can be actively harmful to reproductive fitness if it leads you to, say, decide not to have kids because you are pessimistic about the future.

[fc417fc802]

> it overlooks the fact that what triumphs in the long run is simply reproductive fitness.

Why can't that observation be taken into account? Isn't the entire point of the approach accounting for all inputs to the extent possible?

I think you are making invalid assumptions about the motivations or goals or internal state or etc of the actors which you are then conflating with the approach itself. That there are certain conditions under which the approach is not an optimal strategy does not imply that it is never competitive under any.

The observation is then that rationalism requires certain prerequisites before it can reliably out compete other approaches. That seems reasonable enough when you consider that a fruit fly is unlikely to be able to successfully employ higher level reasoning as a survival strategy.

[lisper]

> Why can't that observation be taken into account?

Of course it can be. I'm saying that AFAICT it generally isn't.

> rationalism requires certain prerequisites before it can reliably out compete other approaches

Yes. And one of those, IMHO, is explicit recognition that rationalism does not triumph simply because it is rational, and coming up with strategies to compensate. But the rationalist community seems too hung up on things like malicious AI and Roko's basilisk to put much effort into that.

[stuartjohnson12]

This argument proves too much. If rationalism can't "triumph" (presumably over other modes of thought) because evolution makes moral realism unobservable, then no epistemic framework will help you - does empirically observing the brutality of evolution lead to better results? Or perhaps we should hypothesise that it's brutal and then test that prediction against what we observe?

I'm sympathetic to the idea that we know nothing because of the reproductive impulse to avoid doing or thinking about things that led our ancestors to avoid procreation, but such a conclusion can't be total because otherwise it is self defeating because is is contingent on rationalist assumptions about the mind's capacity to model knowledge.

[fc417fc802]

The point being made is that rationalism is a framework. Having a framework does not imply competent execution. At lower levels of competence other strategies win out. At higher levels of competence we expect rationalism to win out.

Even then that might not always be the case. Sometimes there are severe time or bandwidth or energy or other constraints that preclude carefully collecting data and thinking things through. In those cases a heuristic that is very obviously not derived from any sort of critical thought process might well be the winning strategy.

There will also be cases where the answer provided by the rational approach will be to conform to some other framework. For example where cult type ingroup dynamics are involved across a large portion of the population.

[smallnamespace]

> Being in contact with reality can be actively harmful to reproductive fitness if it leads you to, say, decide not to have kids because you are pessimistic about the future.

The fact that you can write this sentence, consider it to be true, and yet still hold in your head the idea that the future might be bad but it's still important to have children suggests that "contact with reality" is not a curse.

[imtringued]

You got Darwinism exactly backwards. Darwinism and nature do not select like an algorithm. There is no cost function in reality and no population selection and reproduction algorithm. What you're seeing is the illusion of selection due to selection bias.

If gender equality and intellectual achievement don't produce children, then that isn't "darwinism selecting rationality out". You can't expect the continued existence of finite lifespan organisms if there are no replacement organisms. Raising children is hard work. The people who believe in gender equality and intellectual achievement made the decision to not want more of themselves, particularly when their belief in gender equality entails not wanting male offspring. The alternative is essentially freeloading and expecting others, who do not share the beliefs, to produce children for you and also to teach them the "enlightened" belief of forcing "enlightened" beliefs onto others (note the circularity, the initial conditions are usually irrelevant and often just a fig leaf to perpetuate the status quo).

[lisper]

> no population selection and reproduction algorithm

I never said there was. Darwin said it because he didn't know anything about genes, but that mistake was corrected by Dawkins.

> If gender equality and intellectual achievement don't produce children, then that isn't "darwinism selecting rationality out".

Why not?

> The people who believe in gender equality and intellectual achievement made the decision to not want more of themselves

That's the wrong way to look at it. Individuals are not the unit of reproduction. Genes are. Genes that build brains that want to have (and raise) children are more likely to propagate than genes that build brains that don't, all else being equial. So it is not rationality per se that is the problem -- rationality can provide a reproductive advantage because it lets you, for example, build technology. The problem is that non-rational brains can parasitically benefit from the phenotype of rational brains, at least for a while. But in the long run this is not a stable equilibrium.

[Rastonbury]

Couple of point to that, mainly why should one have to follow darwinian evolution just because we are a product of that. It's similar to the natural law argument against homosexuality, that unnatural sex is wrong. The argument against that is natural biology does not inform what is good or what we should do.

I'm sure you would be able to predict what a rationalise will say when you ask them what future they prefer: one where we maximises for the number of humans or one with fewer humans but better lives

[lisper]

> why should one have to follow darwinian evolution

That depends on what you mean by "follow". You have to "follow" Darwinian evolution for the same reason you have to "follow", say, the law of gravity. That doesn't mean you can't build airplanes and spacecraft, but you still have to acknowledge and "follow" the law of gravity. You can't just glue feathers to your arms, jump off a cliff, and hope for the best. (Actually, rationalists aren't even gluing feathers to their arms. They are doing the equivalent of jumping off a cliff because they just don't believe gravity applies to them.)

[UPDATE]

> unnatural sex is wrong

The problem with that argument is that homosexuality is not unnatural. Many, many species have homosexual relations. Accounting for this is a little bit challenging, but the fact is undeniable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexual_behavior_in_animals

[mensetmanusman]

Pointing to other species can be futile since they also eat their young and are horrible partners :)

[lisper]

Well, yeah, the whole "against nature" argument is bogus to begin with. But I think a counter-argument is stronger if it can be made even while accepting the other side's premises.

[dtj1123]

An issue with this line of reasoning is that Darwinian evolution fails to accurately describe real evolutionary processes.

A counterexample is meiotic drive, where alleles disrupt the meiotic process in order to favour their own transmission, even if the alleles in question ultimately produce a less fit organism.

Whilst this is not an inherently positive observation, I think it does illustrate that the fatalistic picture you're painting here is incorrect. There's room for tentative optimism.

[lisper]

> Darwinian evolution fails to accurately describe real evolutionary processes.

That is not correct. Darwin did make a mistake, but it was not the fundamental dynamics of the process, but that he chose the wrong unit of selection. Darwin thought that selection selected for individuals or species when in fact it selects for genes. Richard Dawkins is the person who figured this out, but Darwin knew nothing about genes (OoS was published only three years after Gregor Mendel's work) so he still gets the credit nothwithsanding this mistake.

[dtj1123]

I don't think you've understood my point. I'm not suggesting that selection doesn't occur, but rather that selection is only part of the story. Have a look at gene flow or genetic drift if you want to know more, they're both examples of non-selective processes that influence the genetic makeup of a population.

[lisper]

> selection is only part of the story

Of course. Variation is the other part.

> gene flow or genetic drift

Those are two mechanisms by which variation occurs. This is not something Darwin got wrong, he just didn't have all the data. Genes were unknown in Darwin's time.

[dtj1123]

Which of selection or variation does meiotic drive fall under?

Clearly it isn't Darwinian selection, because it can favour transmission of genes which are not conducive to survival.

Clearly it isn't variation, because it tends to reduce the degree of genetic polymorphism within a population.

[lisper]

Meiotic drive is selection.

> it isn't Darwinian selection, because it can favour transmission of genes which are not conducive to survival

This is the one thing that Darwin got wrong: he thought that the unit of selection was the organism, but it's not. The unit of selection is the gene. Richard Dawkins is the one who figured this out. Meiotic drive is not Darinian selection, but it is selection. But Darwin could not possibly have known this because genes were unknown at the time.

[GoblinSlayer]

Darwinism isn't a weakness of rationality, teleology has fine tuning problem, while darwinism is minimally fine tuned to work from scratch, which can be said to be optimal. Also darwinism doesn't select for reproductive fitness, it's only a proxy goal; true goal is survival, so you can produce more offspring only in a way compatible with true goal.

[lisper]

> Darwinism isn't a weakness of rationality

I didn't say it was. I said that the Rationalist community is not taking the implications of Darwinism into account when they choose where to focus their attention. This is what leads them to fixate on hostile AI and the MWI when what they should be worried about is the rise of MAGA. But not only is that not what they are worried about, many self-styled Rationalists are Trump supporters.

[naasking]

> If you are a gene, you can probably produce more offspring in an already-industrialized environment by making brains that lean more towards misogyny and sexual promiscuity than gender equality and intellectual achievement.

The fact that humans are intelligent at all and Enlightenment peoples currently dominate the world suggests otherwise.

[lisper]

> Enlightenment peoples currently dominate the world

Huh??? How do you figure? AFAICT the world is dominated by Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin (if you reckon by power) or Christians and Muslims (if you reckon by population). None of these individuals or groups can be properly categorized as "Enlightenment peoples", certainly not with a capital E.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_Enlightenment

[naasking]

Western nations have dominated the world for centuries, in science, technology and cultural dominance. Russia is a bit player and has been for some time. Even if China were to ascend to equal prominence as the US, it would be an outlier in an otherwise clear trend.

[lisper]

> Western nations have dominated the world for centuries

I guess that depends on what you consider "the world". It makes no sense to even talk about the West dominating "the world" before 1492. The first truly global Western empire was Britain, but it was also the last. It was replaced by the U.S. but it was never really global. Even at the height of its power after WW2 the USSR was a credible rival. After the fall of the USSR in 1991 the U.S. was the sole undisputed superpower for a little while, but that came to an abrupt end on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I think you are over-extrapolating the past into the future. The mindset and culture that produced U.S. hegemony in the 20th century seems to me to be mostly extinct. The U.S. was indeed ruled by rationalism (more or less) from the time of its founding through the mid-to-late 20th century, but there is precious little of that left today. Certainly the power structure in the U.S. today is actively hostile to rationalism, and I don't see a whole lot of rationalism in play in the opposition either.

[TheAncientGeek]

But rationalism , if the modern sort, isn't supposed to be descriptive, it's supposed to be normative -- rationality lets you win.

[lisper]

The problem is not with rationalism, it's with Rationalism (with a capital R), the cult-like phenomenon that has grown up around rationalism that fetishizes things like Bayes's theorem, hostile AI, Roko's basilisk, and the MWI.

[munksbeer]

I hesitate to nitpick, but Darwinism (as far as I know) is not really the term to use because Darwin's theory was limited to life on earth. Only later was the concept generalised into "natural selection" or "survival of the fittest".

I'm not sure I entirely understand what you're arguing here, but I absolutely do agree that the most powerful force in the universe is natural selection.

[adastra22]

The modern understanding of Darwin's theory (even the original theory, not necessarily neo-Darwinian extensions of it) apply to the origins of life and non-biological systems as well. Darwin himself was largely concerned with biology and restricted his published writings to that topic, but even he saw the application to the origin of life, and implications for religion. Even if he hadn't, we generally still use the discoverer's name to a theory even when applied to a domain outside their original area of concern.

The term "survival of the fittest" predates Darwin's Origin of Species, and was adopted by Darwin within his lifetime, btw.

[lisper]

The term "Darwinian evolution" applies to any process that comprises iterated replication with random mutation followed selection for some quality metric. Darwin himself would not have defined it that way, but he still deserves the credit for being the first to recognize and document the power of this simple process.