[macOSCryptoAI]

Was wondering about that, that part seems missing... Isn't there at least one time the user must approve the interaction with the MCP server and data sent to it?

The existence of a "Allow always" is certainly problematic, but it's a good reminder that prompt injection and confused deputy issues are still a major issue with LLM apps, so don't blindly allow all interactions.

[mirzap]

I simply don't see how you could enforce a classic permission system on an MCP server. MCPs are API servers that allow LLMs access to context within the boundaries you set. You can set permissions for what an LLM has access to and define those boundaries. However, setting a permission on a context that an LLM has access to is futile. There will always be a prompt that will leak some "sensitive" data. This is like creating an index in a classic search engine with public and private data and then trying to enforce permissions based on certain keywords. There will always be a keyword that leaks something.