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by donnachangstein
401 days ago
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> The users (i.e. high level U.S. officials) did no due diligence. But why would they? It's not their job. They have massive IT staff supporting them. "High level U.S. officials" are just executives; the pointy-haired bosses to the pointy-haired boss. Only difference is these wear little decorative pins over their breast pocket. Every Fortune 500 company has dedicated IT staff for execs; someone you can call 24/7 and say "my shit's broke" and they respond "we just overnighted you a new phone". These people couldn't even install an app on their MDM-controlled device, now the narrative has become we expect them to be making low-level IT decisions too? Next week we'll be scrutinizing Pete Hegseth's lack of thoughts on rotating backup tapes. |
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I think that's a misdirection.
The narrative is that:
a) they were using a compromised piece of software
b) they should not have been using that software - not (necessarily) because it was compromised, but because it wasn't US DoD accredited for that use case.
(I understand your point that these guys are not tech savvy, and do not need to be, but they should be regulation-savvy (clearly they either are not, or willingly broke those regulations), and they should be following organisational guidelines that presumably cover the selection and use of these tools types.)