[lo_zamoyski]

"How colors work" is dubious.

In physics, color has been redefined as a surface reflectance property with an experiential artefact as a mental correlate. But this understanding is the result of the assumptions made by Cartesian dualism. That is, Cartesian dualism doesn't prove that color as we commonly understand it doesn't exist in the world, only in the mind. No, it defines it to be the case. Res extensa is defined as colorless; the res cogitans then functions like a rug under which we can sweep the inexplicable phenomenon of color as we commonly understand it. We have a res cogitans of the gaps!

Of course, materialists deny the existence of spooky res cogitans, admitting the existence of only res extensa. This puts them in a rather embarrassing situation, more awkward that the Cartesian dualist, because now they cannot explain how the color they've defined as an artefact of consciousness can exist in a universe of pure res extensa. It's not supposed to be there! This is an example of the problem of qualia.

So you are faced with either revising your view of matter to allow for it to possess properties like color as we commonly understand them, or insanity. The eliminativists have chosen the latter.

[ajross]

There's no definition for "color" in physics. Physics does quantum electrodynamics. Chemistry then uses that to provides an abstracted mechanism for understanding molecular absorption spectra. Biology then points out that those "pigments" are present in eyes, and that they can drive nerve signals to brains.

Only once you're at the eye level does anyone start talking about "color". And yes, they define it by going back to physics and deciding on some representative spectra for "primary" colors (c.f. CIE 1931).

Point being: everything is an abstraction. Everything builds on everything else. There are no simple ideas at the top of the stack.

[lo_zamoyski]

> There's no definition for "color" in physics.

This is unnecessarily pedantic. Your explanation demonstrates that.

> There are no simple ideas at the top of the stack.

I don't know what a "simple idea" is here, or what an abstraction is in this context. The latter has a technical meaning in computer science which is related to formalism, but in the context of physical phenomena, I don't know. It smells of reductionism, which is incoherent [0].

[0] https://firstthings.com/aristotle-call-your-office/

[ffwd]

> To untutored common sense, the natural world is filled with irreducibly different kinds of objects and qualities: people; dogs and cats; trees and flowers; rocks, dirt, and water; colors, odors, sounds; heat and cold; meanings and purposes.

It's too early to declare that there are irreducible things in the universe. All of those things mentioned are created in the brain and we don't know how the brain works, or consciousness. We can't declare victory on a topic we don't fully understand. It's also a dubious notion to say things are irreducible when it's quite clear all of those things come from a single place (the brain), of which we don't have a clear understanding.

We know some things like the brain and the nervous system operate at a certain macro level in the universe, and so all it observes are ensembles of macro states, it doesn't observe the universe at the micro level, it's then quite natural that all the knowledge and theories it develops are on this macro scopic / ensemble level imo. The mystery of this is still unsolved.

Also regarding the physics itself, we know that due to the laws of physics, the universe tends to cluster physical matter together into bigger objects, like planets, birds, whatever. But those objects could be described as repeating patterns in the physical matter, and that this repeating nature causes them to behave as if they do have a purpose. The purpose is in the repetition. This is totally inline with reductionism.

[lo_zamoyski]

> It's too early to declare that there are irreducible things in the universe. [...] We can't declare victory on a topic we don't fully understand.

This isn't a matter of discovering contingent facts that may or may not be the case. This is a matter of what must be true lest you fall into paradox and incoherence and undermine the possibility of science and reason themselves. For instance, doubting rationality in principle is incoherent, because it is presumably reason that you are using to make the argument, albeit poorly. Similar things can be said about arguments about the reliability of the senses. The only reason you can possibly identify when they err is because you can identify when they don't. Otherwise, how could you make the distinction?

These may seem like obviously amateurish errors to make, but they surface in various forms all over the place. Scientists untutored in philosophical analysis say things like this all the time. You'll hear absurd remarks like "The human brain evolved to survive in the universe, not to understand it" with a confidence of understanding that would make Dunning and Kruger chuckle. Who is this guy? Some kind of god exempt from the evolutionary processes that formed the brains of others? There are positions and claims that are simply nonstarters because they undermine the very basis for being able to theorize in the first place. If you take the brain to be the seat of reason, and then render its basic perceptions suspect, then where does that leave science?

We're not talking about the products of scientific processes strictly, but philosophical presuppositions that affect the interpretation of scientific results. If you assume that physical reality is devoid of qualitative properties, and possesses only quantifiable properties, then you will be led to conclusions latent in those premises. It's question begging. Science no more demonstrates this is what matter is like than the proverbial drunk looking for his keys in the dark demonstrates that his keys don't exist because they can't to be found in the well-lit area around a lamp post. What's more, you have now gotten yourself into quite the pickle: if the physical universe lacks qualities, and the brain is physical, then what the heck are all those qualities doing inside of it! Consciousness has simply been playing the role of an "X-of-the-gaps" to explain away anything that doesn't fit into the aforementioned presuppositions.

You will not find an explanation of consciousness as long as you assume a res extensa kind of matter. The most defining feature of consciousness is intentionality, and intentionality is a species of telos, so if you begin with an account of matter that excludes telos, you will never be able to explain consciousness.

[ffwd]

But the problem is we don't know how it works. It's not about assuming consciousness is outside of physical reality or something like this, it's simply the fact that we don't have an understanding of it.

For example if we could see and trace all intentional thoughts/acts before they occurred (in matter), intentionality would cease to be a property, it would be an illusion.

All things that we know of in the universe function as physical matter, and we know the brain is a physical thing with 80 billion neurons and trillions of connections. What's the simplest explanation?

1) This is an incredibly complicated physical thing that we don't understand yet (and quite naturally so, with it having an incredible number of "moving parts")

or 2) there are qualitative elements in the universe that we don't have the scientific tools to measure or analyze, even in principle

I go with #1 because that's what every fiber is telling me (although I admit I don't know, of course). And with #1 also comes reductionism. It is a physical system we just don't have the mental models to understand it.

I also want to say there could be another aspect that affects consciousness - namely the appearance of a "present now" that we experience in consciousness. This present moment is not really explained in physics but it could have something to do with how consciousness works. How I don't know but it all relates to how we model physics itself mentally.

[ajross]

> I don't know what a "simple idea" is here

To be blunt: it's whatever was in your head when you decided to handwave-away science in your upthread comment in favor of whatever nonsense you wanted to say about "Cartesian dualism".

No, that doesn't work. If you want to discount what science has to say you need to meet it on its own turf and treat with the specifics. Color is a theory, and it's real, and fairly complicated, and Descartes frankly brought nothing to the table.

[lo_zamoyski]

> it's whatever was in your head

That doesn't make anything "simple". Analysis operates on existing concepts, which means they're divisible. It's clear words are being thrown around without any real comprehension of them. This is a stubborn refusal to examine coarse and half-baked notions.

> If you want to discount what science has to say you need to meet it on its own turf and treat with the specifics.

Except this isn't a matter of science. These are metaphysical presuppositions that are being assumed and read into the interpretation of scientific results. So, if anything, this is a half-assed, unwitting dabbling in metaphysics and a failure to meet metaphysics on its own turf.

> whatever nonsense you wanted to say about "Cartesian dualism" [...] Descartes frankly brought nothing to the table

That's nice. But I haven't "handwaved-away" science. It is you who have handwaved-away any desire to understand the subject beyond a recitation of an intellectually superficial grasp of what's at stake. To say Descartes has nothing to do with any of this betrays serious ignorance.

See above [0].

[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44014069

[jchanimal]

Love your perspective. It reminds me of this argument I’m working on about Turing machine qualia. Maybe my argument is just Searle in disguise? https://x.com/jchris/status/1815379571736551923?s=46&t=8A60w...