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by renmillar
396 days ago
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You're making an assumption that doesn't match reality - vulnerability discovery doesn't work like some efficient market. Yes, intelligence agencies and sophisticated criminal groups might find 0-days, but they typically target selectively, not deploying exploits universally. The real threat comes from the vast number of opportunistic attackers who lack the skills to discover vulnerabilities themselves but are perfectly capable of weaponizing public disclosures and proof-of-concepts. These bottom-feeders represent a much larger attack surface that only materializes after public disclosure. Responsible disclosure gives vendors time to patch before this larger wave of attackers gets access to the vulnerability information. It's not about protecting company reputation - it's about minimizing the window of mass exploitation. Timing the disclosure to match the fix release is actually the most practical approach for everyone involved. It eliminates the difficult choice customers would otherwise face - either disrupt their service entirely or knowingly remain vulnerable. Most organizations simply can't afford the downtime from abruptly cutting off a service, nor can they accept the risk of continuing with a known vulnerability. Providing the fix simultaneously with disclosure allows for orderly patch deployment without service interruption. This coordinated approach minimizes disruption while still addressing the security issue - a balanced solution that protects both the security and continuity needs of end users. |
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> It eliminates the difficult choice customers would otherwise face - either disrupt their service entirely or knowingly remain vulnerable.
You decided they are better off not having to make that choice, so you make it for them whether they like it or not.
In fact, you made the worst choice for them, because you chose that they'd remain unknowingly vulnerable, so they can't even put in temporary mitigations or extra monitoring, or know to be on the lookout for anything strange.
> Most organizations simply can't afford the downtime from abruptly cutting off a service, nor can they accept the risk of continuing with a known vulnerability.
Now this is an interesting part, because the first half is true depending on the service, but bad (that's a BCDR or internet outage issue waiting to happen), and the second half is just wrong (show me a company that doesn't know and accept that they have past-SLA vulns unpatched, criticals included, and I'll show you a company that's lying either to themselves or their customers).
> This coordinated approach minimizes disruption while still addressing the security issue - a balanced solution that protects both the security and continuity needs of end users.
This is not a balanced approach, this is a lowest-common-denominator approach that favors service providers over service users. You don't know if it protects someone's security needs, because people have different security needs: a journalist being targeted by a state actor can have the same iphone as someone's retired grandma, or infotainment system, or home assistant, etc.
I've managed bug bounty and unpaid disclosure programs, professionally, and I know firsthand that it's the company's interests that responsible disclosure serves, first and foremost.