[cedws]

I’ve been reviewing the third party Actions we use at work and seen some scary shit, even with pinning! I’ve seen ones that run arbitrary unpinned install scripts from random websites, cloning the HEAD of repos and running code from there, and other stuff. I don’t think even GitHub’s upcoming “Immutable Actions” will help if people think it’s acceptable to pull and run arbitrary code.

Many setup Actions don’t support pinning binaries by checksum either, even though binaries uploaded to GitHub Releases can be replaced at will.

I’ve started building in house alternatives for basically every third party Action we use (not including official GitHub ones) because almost none of them can be trusted not to do stupid shit.

GitHub Actions is a security nightmare.

[MillironX]

Even with pinning, a common pattern I've seen in one of my orgs is to have a bot (Renovate, I think Dependabot can do this too) automatically update the pinned SHA when a new release comes out. Is that practically any different than just referencing a tag? I'm genuinely curious.

[wongarsu]

I guess you still have some reproducibility and stability benefits. If you look at an old commit you will always know which version of the action was used. Might be great if you support multiple releases (e.g. if you are on version 1.5.6 but also make new point releases for 1.4.x and 1.3.x). But the security benefits of pinning are entirely negated if you just autoupdate the pin.