I think it's context-dependent: I don't have insight into OSS Nokalva's use inside big companies, but in the Open Source world it certainly isn't dominant.
In Open Source, I think the biggest ASN.1 implementations I come across are OpenSSL's, libtasn1, asn1c, and then per-language implementations like pyasn1.
Most of the open source tools need patching to properly support certain scenarios (been there done that). They also lack support for parsing ASN.1 Value Notation format (textual), which is used everywhere in specifications, OSS Nokalva offers the full set of tools to handle this even with a playground and ASN.1 editor, this is non-existent in open source right now. For now the open source tools only focus on the crypto aspect, and doesn't really dive into telco, banking, biometric, and others.
> In the ASN.1 space everyone hopes that someone can dethrone OSS Nokalva's proprietary solutions
You're buying more than a compiler and runtime, though: you're also getting an SLA and a stricter guarantee about interoperability and bugs and so forth. I have no idea how good their support is (maybe it's atrocious?), but these are important. I had a client who relied on the open-sourced asn1c once who complained about some of the bugs they found in it; they got pushed into buying commercial when the cost-benefit outweighed the software licensing issues.
> Meh. After all, if you're not using ASN.1 you're using something like ProtocolBuffers or FlatBuffers or whatever and all open source tooling.
Oh sure--there are plenty of alternatives to ASN.1. My guess is that most people who have the choice don't use ASN.1 precisely because open-source alternatives exist and can feasibly work for most use cases.
But if you happen to have one of the use cases that require ASN.1, open sourced tooling can be problematic precisely because of the need for a robust SLA.
> But if you happen to have one of the use cases that require ASN.1, open sourced tooling can be problematic precisely because of the need for a robust SLA.
Why would you need a support SLA for ASN.1 and not for PB/FB? That makes no sense. And there's plenty of open source ASN.1 tooling now -- just look around this thread!
The difference is the quality of the OSS implementation: most OSS ASN.1 tool choke on the enormous 3GPP specs and others used in the telco industry, thus cannot generate 100% valid code.
For some use-cases, you can get by with manually adjust the generated code. That works until the hardware vendors release a new device that use a more modern 3GPP specs and your code start breaking again.
When using a commercial ASN.1 tooling, they often update their compilers to support the latest 3GPP specs even before the hardware vendors, and thus supporting a new device is way simpler.
If I got paid to write an 3GPP implementation one of the things I might do is make one open source ASN.1 stack really good. I've worked on open source projects as part of proprietary work.
> Why would you need a support SLA for ASN.1 and not for PB/FB? That makes no sense. And there's plenty of open source ASN.1 tooling now -- just look around this thread!
If your business depends on five nines plus of reliability in your 5g communications stack, you might be willing to fork over the price for it. Or if you need a bug fix made in a timely fashion to the compiker or runtime, likewise. As I've noted above, a client of mine moved to a commercial suite of tools for this reason.
Protobuf and flatbuffers have different use cases in my experience, although that's somewhat limited. Protobuf at least also introduced breaking changes between versions 2 and 3. ASN.1 isn't perfect in this regard, but these days incompatibikities have to go through ISO or ITU, etc.
Your experience may be different of course. I'm just pointing out that there are reasons people will opt for a commercial product.
> Protobuf and flatbuffers have different use cases in my experience, although that's somewhat limited.
This is true for the ASN.1 encoding rules as well.
> Protobuf at least also introduced breaking changes between versions 2 and 3. ASN.1 isn't perfect in this regard,
When has ASN.1 ever broken backwards compatibility? I've never heard of an ASN.1 backwards incompatibility. Maybe, if you stretch an interpretation of ASN.1 in 1984 to allow new fields to be added to `SEQUENCE { }` then the later addition of extensibility markers could count as a very weak backwards-incompatible change -- weak in that existing specs that use ASN.1 had to add those markers to `SEQUENCE { }`s that were actually intended to be extensible, but no running code was actually broken. I would be shocked if the ITU-T broke backwards compat for running code.
I don't have the time, though I do have the inclination, to finish Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler, which is already quite awesome. u/lukeh used Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler's JSON transformation of modules output to build an ASN.1 compiler and runtime for Swift.
In Open Source, I think the biggest ASN.1 implementations I come across are OpenSSL's, libtasn1, asn1c, and then per-language implementations like pyasn1.