[rmac]

[!warning!]

1) this projects' chrome extension sends detailed telemetry to posthog and amplitude:

- https://storage.googleapis.com/cobrowser-images/telemetry.pn...

- https://storage.googleapis.com/cobrowser-images/pings.png

2) this project includes source for the local mcp server, but not for its chrome extension, which is likely bundling https://github.com/ruifigueira/playwright-crx without attribution

super suss

[namuorg]

Hey, creator of Browser MCP here.

1. Yes, the extension uses an anonymous device ID and sends an analytics event when a tool call is used. You can inspect the network traffic to verify that zero personalized or identifying information is sent.

I collect anonymized usage data to get an idea of how often people are using the extension in the same way that websites count visitors. I split my time between many projects and having a sense of how many active users there are is helpful for deciding which ones to focus on.

2. The extension is completely written by me, and I wrote in this GitHub issue why the repo currently only contains the MCP server (in short, I use a monorepo that contains code used by all my extensions and extracting this extension and maintaining multiple monorepos while keeping them in sync would require quite a bit of work): https://github.com/BrowserMCP/mcp/issues/1#issuecomment-2784...

I understand that you're frustrated with the way I've built this project, but there's really nothing nefarious going on here. Cheers!

[asaddhamani]

Hey, as a maker, I get it. You spent time building something, and you want to understand how it gets used. If you're not collecting personal info, there is nothing wrong with this.

Knee-jerk reactions aren't helpful. Yes, too much tracking is not good, but some tracking is definitely important to improving a product over time and focusing your efforts.

[Trias11]

When people see “I collect” they won’t even bother reading further.

This is showstopper.

Noble reasons won’t matter.

Spyware perception.

[wyldberry]

This seems to be the opposite of what happens in reality.

[nlarew]

"detailed" is an anonymized deviceId and a counter of tool calls? Heaven forbid an app want to get some basic insights into how people use it.

[tomrod]

Correct. Telemetry should _always_ be opt-in and explicitly an easy choice to not engage.

Any other mode of operation is morally bankrupt.

[nlarew]

Really? The hyperbole does not help anyone here.

I don't sign a term sheet when I order at McDonalds but you can be damn sure they count how many big macs I order. Does that make them morally bankrupt? Or is it just a normal business operation that is actually totally reasonable?

[genevra]

McDonald's is probably one of the most morally bankrupt companies out there, but I see your point.

[tomrod]

> Does that make them morally bankrupt?

Yes, it does.

[observationist]

This automatic sense of entitlement to surveil users is the absolute embodiment of the banality of evil.

It's 2025 - we want informed consent and voluntary participation with the default assumption that no, we do not want you watching over our shoulders, and no, you are not entitled to covertly harvest all the data you want and monetize that without notifying users or asking permissions. The whole ToS gotcha game is bullshit, and it's way past time for this behavior to stop.

Ignorance and inertia bolstering the status quo doesn't make it any less wrong to pile more bullshit like this onto the existing massive pile of bullshit we put up with. It's still bullshit.

[nlarew]

You're making a huge jump from "gathering anonymous counters to understand how many people use the thing" to "harvest all the data you want and monetize it".

If they were tracking my identity across sites and actually selling it to the highest bidder that's one thing that we'll definitely agree on. This is so so far from that.

You're welcome to build and use your own MCP browser automation if you're so hostile to the developer that built something cool and free for you to use.

[observationist]

The supply chain vulnerability in any extension is obvious. The problems with telemetry - any at all - are wide ranging and it's crazy to me that people don't see this.

Any covert, involuntary, automatic surveillance of a person for any reason whatsoever should have a court order and legal authority behind it - it's gross and exposes the target to vulnerabilities they're not cognizant of.

For telemetry tracking user behavior to be useful at all, it's got to be associated with a user. The idea of telemetry anonymization is marketing speak for "we obfuscated it, we know deanonymization is trivial, but people are stupid, especially regulators."

Any anonymization done is sufficiently obfuscated such that corporate asses get covered in the case of any regulatory investigation. There's no legitimate, mathematically valid anonymization of user data that you could do without destroying the information that you're trying to get in the first place through these tools. This means that any aggregation of user data useful to a malicious actor will inevitably be compromised - the second Posthog or Amplitude become a desirable target, they'll get pwned and breached, and much handwringing will be done, and there will be no recourse or recompense for damages done.

The only strategy to prevent the dissemination of surveillance data is not to collect it in the first place. It should be illegal to collect the data without voluntary, user initiated participation, and any information collected should be ephemeral with regular inspection to ensure compliance. Any violation of user privacy should result in crippling fines, something like 5% of the value of the company per user per day of violation - if you can't responsibly manage the data, you shouldn't be collecting it.

This means all the automatic continuous development a/b testing intrusive corner cutting corporate bullshit would have to stop. Continually leaking surveillance data to malicious actors year over year with no repercussions has thoroughly demonstrated that people cannot be trusted with safekeeping data.

I will build and use my own automation if I need to, based on products that don't covertly, involuntarily, ignorantly surveil their users, without even being aware of potential for harm, and I'll continue to point it out when it shows up in random projects and products, because it's wrong and it should stop.

We should stop embracing the things that enshittify the world, and stop sacrificing things like "other people's privacy" for convenience or profit.

[payneio]

Thanks for pushing for a realignment of product expectations. I agree.

[arresin]

The only chrome extensions you should install are ones you can build yourself from source.

[neycoda]

... And have reviewed and understand completely

[EGreg]

So ... pretty much none

Keep in mind, extensions can update themselves at any time, including when they're bought out by someone else. In fact, I bet that's a huge draw... imagine buying an extension that "can read and modify data on all your websites" and then pushing an update that, oh I dunno, exfiltrates everyone's passwords from their gmail. How would most people even catch that?

DO NOT have any extensions running by default except "on click".

There should be at least some kind of static checker of extensions for their calls to fetch or other network APIs. The Web is just too permissive with updating code, you've got eval and much more. It would be great if browsers had only a narrow bottleneck through which code could be updated, and would ask the user first.

(That wouldn't really solve everything since there can be sleeper code that is "switched on" with certain data coming over the wire, but better than what we have now.)

[metadat]

It would be interesting if you could easily install browser extensions via a source repository URL (e.g. GitHub, or any git URL), then at least there would be more transparency about who/what you are trusting by installing it. Blindly trusting a mostly anonymous chrome store "install" button seems insane, since they don't do any significant policing. Wasn't the promise of safety one of the primary reasons Google started the chrome store?

[econ]

Like user.script/grease monkey. It use to be that you could publish a reasonably large script and someone would review it. Even better was to start out simple then gradually update it so that existing users can continue reviewing by looking at the changes.

I think the permission system should be much more complicated so that the user gets a prompt that explains what is needed and why.

Furthermore there should be [paid] independent reviewers to sign off on extensions. This adds a lot of credibility, specially to a first time publication without users. That would also give app stores someone to talk to before deleting something. Nefarious actors working for app stores can have their credibility questioned.

[rahimnathwani]

  Keep in mind, extensions can update themselves at any time

GP suggested only installing extensions you can build yourself from source. Most extensions that auto update do so via the Chrome store. If you install an extension from source, that won't happen.

[arresin]

> So ... pretty much none

You’d be surprised. It describes all the extensions I use.