[adrian_b]

I do not think that "security" is the appropriate name for such features.

In my opinion "security" should always refer to the security of the computer owners or users.

These Apple features may be used for enhancing security, but the main purpose for which they have been designed is to provide enhanced control of the computer vendor on how the computer that they have sold, and which is supposed to no longer belong to them, is used by its theoretical owner, i.e. by allowing Apple to decide which programs are run by the end user.

[mike_hearn]

On macOS the security system is open even though the codebase is closed. You can disable SIP and get full root access. Gatekeeper can be configured to trust some authority other than Apple, or disabled completely. You can write and load your own sandbox policies. These things aren't well known and require reading obscure man pages, but the capabilities are there.

Even in the default out-of-the-box configuration, Apple isn't exercising editorial control over what apps you can run. Out of store distribution requires only a verified identity and a notarization pass, but notarization is a fully automated malware scan. There's no human in the loop. The App Store is different, of course.

Could Apple close up the Mac? Yes. The tech is there to do so and they do it on iOS. But... people have been predicting they'd do this from the first day the unfortunately named Gatekeeper was introduced. Yet they never have.

I totally get the concern and in the beginning I shared it, but at some point you have to just stop speculating give them credit for what they've actually done. It's much easier to distribute an app Apple executives don't like to a Mac than it is to distribute an app Linux distributors don't like to Linux users, because Linux app distribution barely works if you go "out of store" (distro repositories). In theory it should be the other way around, but it's not.

[p_ing]

> Even in the default out-of-the-box configuration, Apple isn't exercising editorial control over what apps you can run

Perhaps not in the strictest sense, but Apple continues to ramp up the editorial friction for the end user to run un-notarized applications.

I feel/felt <macOS 15 that right-click Open was an OK approach, but as we know that's gone. It's xattr or Settings.app. More egregious is the monthly reminder that an application is doing something that you want it to do.

A level between "disable all security" and what macOS 15 introduces would be appreciated.

[mike_hearn]

More knobs would be nice, yes. Still nothing stops you using a customized file browser, browser, archiver etc that doesn't set the xattrs at all.

[p_ing]

Sure, common apps will be notarized and will not run into any warnings/blocks. It's those apps which are not where we need to dive into the Terminal or Settings.app.

[saagarjha]

I think you went for a lazy reply rather than actually reading the comment through. Most of the things mentioned here directly improve security for the computer's owner.

[lapcat]

> I think you went for a lazy reply rather than actually reading the comment through.

https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

Your reply could have omitted the first sentence.

Many years ago, at Macworld San Francisco, I met "Perry the Cynic", the Apple engineer who added code signing to Mac OS X. Nice person, but I also kind of hate him and wish I could travel back in time to stop this all from happening.

[saagarjha]

It could have, but I would just replace it with the same link you posted. And we all hate Perry sometimes :)