[dr_dshiv]

Not sure if you are joking, but that’s not a clear summary of platonism.

Platonism does believe that forms exist separate from material instances; like, perfect spheres or triangles are “real,” even if there are no perfect spheres or triangle in the material world. That is a statement for the reality of the immaterial world, for platonists.

However, there are more than just these idealized forms in the immaterial world of forms. There aren’t just right triangles or perfect spheres, there are also forms that have complexity exceeding anything in the material world.

The world of forms might be thought of as the world of information, if that helps. However, it is subtlety different, since information is materially instantiated — and there appear to be hierarchies within the world of forms that somehow take precedence. Eg, the concept of 1 takes precedence over 363279.

The point is that there are forms of individual people, too, in platonism. Plato is vague about this in dialectic, but I believe Plotinus addresses it directly.

[Avicebron]

Right. I want to make it clear I wasn't saying "I support Ayn Rand's thought's on Platonism", what I wanted to convey was my interpretation of what Rand/Piekoff Wrote and why I think they read Plato and had the reaction they did.

I'm not a professional philosopher, but I think the nebulous nature of how Plato addresses forms and shapes is difficult for someone from a Randian Materialistic viewpoint to accept.

I think that even at it's weakest interpretation, the concept of forms and shapes at least provides an avenue for aspirational meditation as we can discuss what an "ideal" of a thing (food, medecine, political ideaology, etc) might be

[dr_dshiv]

Yes, I understood you. Plato has a lot of deliberate vagueness — it’s a dialectical communication, where the knowledge is communicated through the challenges of processing it