[hannasanarion]

> Objectivism has merits around notions of reality being singular and shared by everyone in one way or another, and (hypothesis mine) if everything derives from a singular reality, by understanding this singular reality we should be able to in a certain sense understand everything (including ethics, art and morality, which I think is highly counterintuitive)

But this is a violation of Hume's Guillotine. You cannot derive "ought" statements from "is" statements. There is only one reality, and science can tell us how it is, but science cannot tell us how it ought to be, how much we should like it, or in what ways we should want to alter it.

Rand and her followers fail in their attempted logical chain by leaping from "humans evolved rationality as a tool to survive and enhance their lives" to "enhancement of each individual's life via self-interest is the standard of moral value", which is non-sequitur. Rationality is the ability to make plans and accomplish goals, the fact that it exists does not tell us which goals we should use it in the service of.

She smuggles in her own pre-existing moral preference when she defines individual flourishing as the ultimate moral good. You can see this very easily if you take the exact same syllogism and substitute "community interest" for "personal interest". In fact this modified version of the argument may be even more valid, since a defining feature of humanity even more than our rationality is our unique community organizing power, which is also evolved, and thus community service also serves perfectly well as an evolution-informed yardstick of moral value.

[loki49152]

You can derive morality from observation if you aren't looking for ontological "ought statements". Hume's position assumes that the religious approach to morality is the only one possible - that morality consists of these detached and universal "ought statements" that must be observable in the Universe somehow and take on the same form as Commandments from a God.

That's not how the Objectivist ethics works, at all. There are no "ought statements" because ethics, in Objectivism, is a system of judgement and reasoning. It's applied epistemology.

So, no, you won't find a mythological ethics in reality. But you can learn how to identify the nature of things and judge how they relate, positively or negatively, to human life. And that's the essence of Objectivist morality.

[hannasanarion]

But a system of morality requires the ability to make "ought" statements. Merely saying what exists is not enough information to inform correct decisions, because whether or not something exists is unrelated to whether or not it is good.

When the objectivists try to define "human life" as their yardstick for moral good, again, they smuggle in those preexisting preferences. There is no real principle that means "human life" should be condensed down to individual hedonistic comfort. It is very easy to argue that human life is better served by collective comfort, and thus the best actions are the ones that are self-sacrificing in service of the community, because these are the ones that do the most service to human life.

[gnramires]

> But this is a violation of Hume's Guillotine. You cannot derive "ought" statements from "is" statements. There is only one reality, and science can tell us how it is, but science cannot tell us how it ought to be, how much we should like it, or in what ways we should want to alter it.

Thank you for your comment. To be clear, I am not an objectivist as stated above. Also, I did not know Hume's Guillotine, thanks.

I believe in fact Hume's Guillotine (henceforth HG) can be definitely disproven with what we know today. The root at what's wrong with HG is that feelings are actually real.

To understand why, I like to open with Alan Watts quote: "If nothing is felt, nothing matters.", and also "The meaning of life is just to be alive. It is so plain and so obvious and so simple. (...)".

Suffering is a real phenomenon, even though it is manifested in our brains and minds. All sorts of joys and good feelings are also likewise real. If something really is bad to experience (deep suffering), than that's essentially a fact about reality, and subjective experience is part of reality. If something feels bad, it feels bad, and if something feels good, it feels good (even though our desires and judgements about what feels good and what feels bad have serious issues and limitations we should be keenly aware of). This implies we can (at least in theory) understand the nature of those feelings, and understand what feels good and bad. This constitutes the "ought" -- I would say Hume is right in the sense that oughts derive from feelings (defined in the most general way possible), but wrong in the sense that oughts are inaccessible from "is" or science in general. Feelings, emotions, the character of our inner world all forms various "is"es -- essentially "What you felt, you felt".

The meaning of life is to curate and promote good feelings on everyone's minds, and logically we should be able to defend it couldn't be otherwise. If nothing is felt, nothing matters. Consciousness is an experimental fact, and given we observe it and conclude it's real, it provides a unique sole basis of morality and theory of action. A theory of morality that defends fundamentally something that is besides or disregards consciousness (say claim 1: "The meaning of life is arranging rocks in geometric patterns; humans and sentient life don't matter") is inconsistent with the reality of subjective experience -- bad feelings are bad as an experimental fact and good feelings are good as an experimental fact. A being that asserts Claim 1 is disregarding facts of nature.

In Buddhism one of the Noble Truths recognized by Siddhartha is that suffering exists. In other words, suffering is real. So if an action of mine provokes suffering (conversely if it provokes joy/good feelings) then that provides a solid and definite basis for morality: not all your actions are arbitrary, at least they should avoid causing suffering (and more generally, promote good inner lives).

(Note: Again, finding out what really is good with high certainty is actually difficult and our judgement caries risks and imprecision. I discuss about how to find what is good in the link below)

See more about this here: https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/1iv1x1m/the...

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As a final concession, I suppose you could deny that, although feelings are real, and bad and good feelings exist, that we "ought" to promote good feelings is a "fact" about existence, even though I think that is really inconsistent:

How could a bad feeling factually exist and promoting this bad feeling be good or neutral? If a feeling is said to be bad, that is fundamentally associated with a negative valence of its existence. Negative valence of its existence logically implies it should be avoided in any theory of action or value.

But even if you reject that argument (which I believe in a sense definitely wrong!), once you accept the primacy of consciousness instead of a fact as an axiom/"passion", then I believe you need no more "passionate oughts" in your theory, given you accept subjective experiences to be real, as well as accepting the rest of science and logic of course. Basically all oughts would follow essentially from this single axiom which really makes utmost sense to accept (and as I argued I really think is a fact, or an "is") -- otherwise you might be defending the geometric arrangement of rocks in a dead/unconscious universe, which I really think is absurd and indefensible (both in the sense of our "passions" and to me in the sense of factually false). But it should be fine to take the primacy of consciousness as an axiom or Near-Universal Passion of the Reflective Mind, because we then should agree with everything that follows in any case :)