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by nine_k 456 days ago
What surprises me here is that the client side of the request / response is not considered a cunning, bitter enemy, as it should be. Why is x-middleware-subrequest even accepted in production? Why is x-middleware-rewrite even returned? They are instrumental to the attack, and the client has no business accessing them, ever, in my book.

If these headers are only expected to be available within a trusted zone, and some fronting HTTP server should strip them from incoming requests and outgoing responses, why are they named like regular HTTP headers, and not in some scary, easy-to-filter-way, like x-INTERNAL-ONLY-middleware-something?

To my mind, the server should accept the bare minimum of headers needed to serve the request, and issue the minimum amount of headers to provide a well-formed response, while being completely opaque to the client. Any nifty diagnostics like x-middleware-rewrire belong to the logs; correlate by request ID. Any nifty internal processing tweaks in plain text, like x-middleware-subrequest, are, to my mind, bad architecture. If you need to pass such info between HTTP endpoints internally, use something like a JWT.