[oefrha]

Sure, the blog post didn't mention PQexec would reject it, so I assumed it would be accepted. Turns out it's a narrowly dodged bullet, I'm wrong on that. But having to chain two vulnerabilities together to own the system doesn't make either vulnerability less of a vulnerability. The escape function was wrong, period, another level of defense helped in this case, but "the documentation for the postgres escape function didn't say it escaped input for psql" is a bullshit excuse (it definitely didn't achieve the documented goal of "escaping special characters so that they cannot cause any harm"), putting "CVE" in quotes and blaming it all on the user is wrong.

> I used imprecise language that everyone understands, and you're choosing to read critically in order to be combative.

No, your "imprecise language" is a fundamental and quite dangerous misunderstanding that could easily lead to more vulnerabilities like this one ("PQexecParams = PQexec + PQescapeString, amiright? I'll just use the latter"). Maybe you didn't misunderstand yourself, maybe you did, but it's 100% misleading for readers not familiar with db internals.