The Geneva Convention bans all chemical weapons. Part of the rationale for a total ban is to avoid escalating to more dangerous chemical agents. Helpful r/AskHistorians thread:
Chemical weapons are tactically useless to the American combat doctrine, as described in that article. As we have seen, the Russian doctrine (and Ukraine's doctrine) relies on much more brute force to push a meter at a time and much more indiscriminate damage. It's hard to imagine chemical weapons being useless.
He makes the mistake of looking at how the US military fights and thinking that is the only way to fight a war. Incidentally, if you looked at how the Roman army used short swords and concluded that "long swords are useless for fighting a war," I bet he would have something to say about it.
> He makes the mistake of looking at how the US military fights and thinking that is the only way to fight a war
Keep reading.
"And, so, where do we still see chemical weapons used? In static-system vs. static-system warfare. Thus, in Syria – where the Syrian Civil War has been waged as a series of starve-or-surrender urban sieges, a hallmark of static vs. static fighting – you see significant use of chemical weapons, especially as a terror tactic against besieged civilians. The limited manpower and capabilities of regime forces have caused the war to deteriorate into a series of sieges, sometimes stretching out years (fighting in Aleppo lasted for four years, for instance; the final siege itself ran from February 2014 to its conclusion in December 2016). Anti-regime forces are often poorly equipped (often completely unable, for instance, to engage regime air-assets) and the civilian populace was completely unprotected against chemical munitions, making them far more vulnerable targets.
But a major factor here is actually weakness, in the Syrian regime forces. Assad simply didn’t have a lot of modern air-to-ground munitions; chemical munitions weren’t being compared for cost- and mission-effectiveness against such modern weapons, but against barrels loaded with explosives, nails and scrap – weapons which would have been primitive by the standards of the 1940s, much less now. And – let’s be honest here – his ground forces lack manpower, but also perform quite poorly. Remember: the question for the effectiveness of chemical weapons is value-over-replacement – while the vulnerability of anti-regime forces increased the value, we also must note that Assad’s heavily weakened, static system forces also substantially reduced the value of the replacement. In a fight between what are, in the last analysis, two weak forces, the calculation on the effectiveness of chemical weapons changes."
I read the analysis. I think he's being far too dismissive of the doctrinal considerations in his analysis. Frankly, he is also not an expert on modern warfare in any way, too.
There is a good book called "eating soup with a knife" (and the author has given talks on this) that talks about the importance of doctrine and culture in constructing a fighting force (in this case, the book is mostly about counterinsurgency doctrine and how the American and British militaries are uniquely unsuited to it). An American-style doctrine simply does not work in Russia, even given unlimited resources, because of how the culture and the military work. The weapons are then built to fit the doctrine, not the other way around.
In other words, the "static system" actually is the way to get the Russian military (and the Ukrainian military) to work. That difference in doctrine, by the way, caused a lot of headaches because US weapons are not made for it.
> the "static system" actually is the way to get the Russian military (and the Ukrainian military) to work
Well, yes. They've been unable to launch combined-arms maneouvres. They failed to establish even air supremacy against decades-old NATO air defence kit. Russia has to fight the way it does because it's unable to fight more effectively.
The author's core point stands: we didn't outlaw chemical weapons because of any moral reasons, we outlawed them because the world's leading militaries don't need them. In cases where they have tactical value, lo and behold, they get used.
On that point we agree, that the world's leading militaries don't need them. However, they are a tool that increases the effectiveness of other militaries.
I disagree with him that the specific combined arms shock doctrine is what make those militaries the world's leading ones. Those militaries are leading because they have the best people, weapons, and training, and a combined arms shock doctrine fits with their culture.
That very much depends on what you mean by "worked". And it's not like Western militaries are lacking the physical means to engage in heavier and more damaging attacks; they just have viable alternatives that they prefer.
1) Putin has conquered more population than he lost (even just counting fighting age men)
2) Putin has conquered more money/value/resources than he lost due to the conflict (by a factor of 10, maybe 100)
3) Even Ukraine's European allies seem to agree that Putin will get a ceasefire and sanctions relief where he gets to keep what he conquered
It's true that Russia did not achieve it's war goals (destruction or total control of Ukraine, and let's just not talk about the outright embarrassing "in 3 days" part), but they got quite a bit. Perhaps even more important, they got more than enough to make the conflict, at least potentially, a net positive for Putin.
Why would e.g. sarin be useful for indiscriminate damage when A) you could drop a conventional or thermobaric bomb instead, and B) you can circumvent sarin by wearing a $200 suit from AliExpress? I'm not seeing how it's meant to fit into Russian military doctrine other than in niche circumstances.
If you give me a specific quote from the book I'll be able to understand what you mean a bit better.
I know there's a quote floating around which gives the figure of $2000/km^2 for conventional weapons, $800 for sarin etc., $600 for nuclear, and $1 for biological. I'll respond to that.
The problem is, those numbers are for attacking civilians. You can of course make the argument that Russian military doctrine includes massacring civilians, but I would respond that not only is sarin more expensive against modern military targets, it's outright ineffective against them if they're prepared.
> Chemical weapons are tactically useless for modern militaries [1]. You’re pretty much always better off pounding with high explosives.
Maybe you know something I don't but in country we were always MOPP Ready:
MOPP Ready – Protective mask is carried. First set of suit, gloves, and boots are available within two hours, second set within six hours.
My mask was usually in the truck or in my pack. We qualify with our masks on a yearly basis. It could be argued that the chance of chemical deterrents that require MOPP 0 and above is negligible due to the our current landscape but that can honestly change based on the opponent or geography.
Chemical weapons are tactically useless for modern militaries [1]. You’re pretty much always better off pounding with high explosives.
And there isn’t a known path to escalation potential. If there were, everyone would be developing it.
[1] https://acoup.blog/2020/03/20/collections-why-dont-we-use-ch...