[ctrlp]

Yes, as you say, an organized shutdown. That is my belief as well. I also believe that national security considerations were a factor and dominance of Ukraine was a policy goal of the West to permanently sever Russia from its Eastern European confederates. This was not secret strategy. It's what any sensible policy would include given the chaos. Power abhors a vacuum. I don't see the controversy. I suppose you would also claim that research at Wuhan has nothing whatsoever to do with bioweapons research. Or perhaps that its research program was independently funded, not by the US government.

[mopsi]

Do you have any actual evidence? So far, you have offered only conjecture.

This seems to be a common trait among people who are into conspiracy theories: they take the mere fact that they can construct a remotely plausible scenario as proof that it is the truth and actually happened.

[ctrlp]

I'm not sure what evidence could convince someone so dead set against the legitimacy of conjecture. I'm one (along with Aristotle and others) who credits inference to the best explanation as a valid form of reasoning. You seem more interested in hurling "conspiracy theory" ad hominem attacks than taking a few minutes to learn some history and consider whether what I'm speculating is merely "remotely plausible" or rather "quite likely." If you lack the time or imagination to do some research, accept the following "actual evidence."

Here is a GAO National Security report to Congress on the topic. I strongly encourage you to read the entire document yourself here https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-00-138.pdf

But first, I'll call your attention to the rank of the people involved in this report. It's not some backbencher vanity project. I hope you'll agree that these aren't "conspiracy theorists". If you bother to read it, of course. I hope you will and admit that your beliefs about this "conspiracy theory" need upgrading.

I'll quote liberally from the GAO report below but this is just one example of many documents available (if you merely look) that should meet a reasonable standard of evidence. For instance you could read the lucid book BioHazard by a former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program. He talks about biodefense and vaccine programs (among other things) in the context of the bioweapons arms race, and the billions of dollars allocated by the US to "biodefense". If you think all that money is going to crop management I've got a bridge to sell you. https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/esmallpox/biohazard_alibek.pd...

Here you go. If you come back to insist that none of this means that the labs are developing bioweapons "per se" I refer you back to the report's urgent observations that it is very difficult to distinguish legitimate biodefense programs from bioweapons programs (as I have been arguing). If you still can't accept that the US "biodefense program" is the rebranded "bioweapons program", I can't help you with that cognitive bias.

-----------

"April 28, 2000 The Honorable Floyd Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable Pat Roberts Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

Although it signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1 the former Soviet Union covertly developed the world’s largest offensive biological weapons program, which relied on a network of military and nonmilitary scientific institutes, according to a January 2000 Department of Defense report to Congress. 2 Many of these nonmilitary institutes were overseen by Biopreparat—an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical enterprise that exploited the inherent dual-use nature of biotechnology to mask Soviet development of biological weapons using specially engineered strains of dangerous pathogens, including anthrax, plague, and smallpox. Russia renounced the Soviet program in 1992 and subsequently cut funding for Biopreparat institutes; nonetheless, the United States remains concerned about the extent of Russia’s compliance with the Convention. Reasons for concern include Biopreparat’s retention of its Cold War leadership and existing ties to former Soviet nonmilitary biological weapons institutes in Russia, although Biopreparat no longer funds them. Although Russia has generally allowed the United States access to its nonmilitary institutes that receive U.S. nonproliferation assistance, Russia has consistently rebuffed U.S. efforts to inspect its military institutes currently managed by the Ministry of Defense. Notwithstanding these concerns, in 1994 the United States began funding collaborative research projects with former Soviet biological weapons scientists 3 because it feared that these scientists might be driven by financial pressures to sell their skills to countries of proliferation concern or to terrorist groups. 4 The executive branch initially funded this effort at modest levels and used it to redirect scientists to peaceful activities; however, it is now expanding the program’s size and scope. Because of this shift, you asked us to review U.S. efforts to address the threat of biological weapons proliferation from the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, we examined • the potential threats that the former Soviet biological weapons institutes could pose to the United States, • current and future U.S. efforts to address these threats, and • risks associated with the expanded U.S. effort and executive branch plans to mitigate them."

It goes on:

"The former Soviet Union’s biological weapons institutes continue to threaten U.S. national security because they have key assets that are both dangerous and vulnerable to misuse, according to State and Defense Department officials. These assets include as many as 15,000 underpaid scientists and researchers, specialized facilities and equipment (albeit often in a deteriorated condition), and large collections of dangerous biological pathogens. These assets could harm the United States if hostile countries or groups were to hire the institutes or biological weapons scientists to conduct weapons-related work. Also of concern is the potential sale of dangerous pathogens to terrorist groups or countries of proliferation concern. State and Defense officials told us that since 1997, Iran and other countries have intensified their efforts to acquire biological weapons expertise and materials from former Soviet biological weapons institutes. In addition, deteriorated physical safety and security conditions could leave dangerous pathogens vulnerable to theft or distribution into the local environment. Finally, much of the former Soviet biological weapons program’s infrastructure, such as buildings and equipment, still exists primarily in Russia. While most of these components have legitimate biotechnological applications, they also harbor the potential for renewed production of offensive biological agents. The U.S. strategy for addressing these proliferation threats at the source has been to fund collaborative research activities with the institutes to

(1) reduce their incentives to work with hostile states and groups and

(2) increase their openness to the West.

While the executive branch initially implemented this strategy with a modest level of funding, it is now seeking a tenfold increase in funding in response to intensified proliferation attempts by Iran and other countries of proliferation concern. The increased funding will support an expanded array of collaborative activities, including biodefense research 5 against biological agents, security upgrades to select facilities, and dismantlement of unneeded facilities.

• For fiscal years 1994 through 1999, the United States allocated about $20 million, primarily from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, to fund collaborative research projects to help redirect former biological weapons scientists to peaceful research activities. Key program benefits during this period included providing grants to fund more than 2,200 former Soviet biological weapons personnel—including more than 745 senior biological weapons scientists—and gaining some access to more than 30 of about 50 nonmilitary institutes. State and Defense officials told us that the U.S. programs have denied proliferators such as Iran access to biological weapons expertise and scientists at over 15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes.

• For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the executive branch plans to spend about $220 million to expand its efforts to engage former Soviet biological weapons institutes. About half of these funds will be used to continue efforts to redirect scientists toward peaceful civilian research.

• In an emerging area of emphasis, Defense and State plan to spend about $36 million to fund collaborative research with Russian institutes on dangerous pathogens. This research is intended to improve the U.S. defenses against biological weapons threats. The Department of Defense also plans to spend (1) $40 million to upgrade security and safety systems at select facilities in Russia and (2) $39 million to consolidate and dismantle biological weapons facilities in Russia as it has done in Kazakhstan—if Russia agrees."

There's much more. Read the full report.