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by stouset
478 days ago
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Your perspective is coming from a very rigid all-or-nothing mentality and I don’t think it’s wise to see things that way. Sure, a web browser that needs to open arbitrary network connections can be built to phone home. But nearly none of the components it’s built out of can. The image decoding and rendering libraries can’t touch the network, the rendering engine can’t touch the network, and nor can the dozens of other subcomponents it needs to work. Your installed editor extensions can’t phone home even if the editor itself can. Or perhaps even the editor itself wouldn’t be able to, if extensions are installed out of band. Your graphics driver vendor can’t phone home, your terminal can’t phone home, and on and on and on. A solution doesn’t have to be perfect for it to be an improvement, so stop acting like it does. |
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Anyway, you’ve just proven my point with “install extensions out of band” - you’ve ceded that it’s a losing position technically and are arguing for alternative UX solutions. I’m not pretending it has to be perfect. Like I said, capabilities are great for creating a secure OS and writing more secure software more generally. But the threat model it’s protecting against is not software that phones home but against the size of the exploit opened up from a compromise.
Think about it this way, Android apps and iOS apps are largely sandboxed through a primitive capabilities system already, not super fine-grained capabilities but still the same concept. Would you care to claim that privacy and malware isn’t a problem on these systems or that the permissions model has meaningfully curtailed anything but the most egregious of problems?