[epakai]

The point of the security guarantee is to ensure peace after a ceasefire. It doesn't make any sense to suggest US troops will be responsible for stopping the war or reversing territorial gains, because it will have already stopped. Some stasis of of the front lines, and possibly a DMZ would be a prerequisite.

But more likely, US troops won't be directly on the front lines even after a peace. It adds too much risk of either (super)power escalating in the event of casualties.

[_bin_]

i don't believe the ukraine has shown willingness to accept anything less than a status quo ante bellum resolution. i don't really blame her for this - in her position, i'd push for everything back plus the crimea to boot - but that puts us in a very precarious position were we to guarantee her security.

the way i see this, it's fine if ukraine loses a little territory. since putin is an evil dictator and all, he can't especially afford to look weak, and anything less would back him into a corner. however, doing so is a risky move so we should hold off on that for another year or two until russia is truly crippled. ensure an economic depression and depletion of materiel that takes a decade to dig out of. by doing so, we also give the ukraine stronger security in fact, rather than merely on paper.

might be worth bargaining with the crimea: renounce claims to it in exchange for russia returning territory from the current war. realistically russia has wanted that spot at various points for hundreds of years as warm-water ports are too important for her.

i get that the point is to ensure peace after a ceasefire, but, as zelinsky said, russia has broken ceasefires before. we should not sign something like that simply on the assumption that it will make war too costly for russia. we should do so if and only if we're willing to engage in a shooting war/great-power conflict with russia over a couple oblasts. i don't think we're really willing to do that.