| HN Mirror

>A hallmark of a nefarious email (particularly scams but some sales attempts) is that they aim to deceive you.

The very first email has literally everything the company needs to locate and fix the issue without having to sign anything, log into anything, or pay anything.

That is the opposite of a nefarious email.

Nefarious "beg bounty" emails will tell you that you have an issue and then not tell you where it is -- asking for money before revealing the issue.

FWIW, I get several of these emails per week, as the first-reader of security@ emails, and they're almost always scams, sales pitches, or poorly-disguised bounty sniffers.

I can't even count the number of times I've been informed that Wordpress.com (.com, not self-hosted) has severe vulnerabilities. And those are the plausible reports.

But I always respond professionally and with civility, obviously, because if they have useful information for me, I want to hear it.

In defense of the researcher: Their message was better than most, and explained the issue found directly instead of couching it in BS claims. That's good.

In criticism of the researcher: They should have linked to their website where they publish reports, and been more plain about their modus operandi from the outset. Let the company know exactly who they're dealing with, and what to expect. Stating it in a sentence is "good", but linking to the evidence is much more credible.

I've been on both sides of this relationship. My dumbest experience was with a large bank (HQ in the Netherlands, but operating in several countries including the US and AU, and now acquired by a US bank). I reported a total account compromise vulnerability which would affect 12.5% of their users. I thought my email would be well-received and the (very simple and externally-obvious) issue quickly resolved. Instead I got threats and hostility from some SVP IS nitwit. I told him to go pound sand obviously, and it took them a week to fix the problem. My SO was a customer (which is the only reason I noticed the issue), but not for long. :)

JayeLTee 482 days ago

Agreed that the wording to fully understand my intent might not be present on the email and is only achieved when you look at the whole email and what information I provide etc, I've been trying different things to see what works as unfortunately I get ignored totally, A LOT.

That is also the reason there is no direct link to my publications on the actual emails, another link to add suspicion of phishing that leads to being ignored. I do provide a link to my index with all my public finds on the signature of the email though.

Also a google search of my handle which I sign and mention on the email would get multiple hits for reputable news websites such as Databreaches.net, TechCrunch, The Register, Publimetro, but doesn't seem companies do much vetting at all before ignoring the alerts.

I think your email report was good.

I think your blog post was a bit juvenile. Amusing maybe, but you're a professional and there's no need to resort to name-calling. Let the toddler's behaviour speak for itself. You don't need to laugh at them in public. It's fun though, I get it. Just gratuitous.

My recommendation to you, to turn your email report from "good" to "great", would be something like this:

------------

> Hi, I'm an independent security researcher and I publish my findings under the name "Yyyy". My primary website is yyyy.com and I've had reports published in Blah, Blah, and Blah. A quick web search will tell you more about me and my background.

> I'm writing to report an issue I noticed in toddlerceo.com. Specifically:

> (your good and complete list of specifics here, including exposure risk and high level mitigation notes if practical).

> My intent is to improve the security of the Internet, and to write about the kinds of issues I've discovered. The issue I've described here will make for an interesting and valuable article, but I don't want to publish until you've had a chance to fix the issue, so my standard procedure is to delay publication for 30 days. I'll work on the article now, and schedule it for publication on March 24th, 2025.

> Please let me know if you need any more details on the issue I've found.

----------

This may be more than they deserve! But that's OK, because you're a professional and if you are lucky enough to get a professional on the other side of the conversation, you will earn their respect, at no cost to you.

And let's be honest: your motivation for writing this article is self-promotional. You want work. Impress the CEO/security officer/etc, and you will get work, or referrals for work. So it may be more than they deserve, but it works in your interests too.

>They should have linked to their website where they publish reports, and been more plain about their intentions from the outset.

I don't get this. Their intentions should be clear by the fact that they reveal the entirety of the issue (what's wrong, why it's wrong, where to find it) in the first email. They don't ask for money, hide information behind further correspondence, or anything else that would raise suspicion.

The company has everything they need to locate, verify, and fix the issue without having to ever interact with the security researcher again. That's about as obviously well-intentioned as you can get.

Like I said, it was "good", and better than most.

But as the reader of lots of these emails, I'm always happier to hear from someone who is able to establish their credibility and intentions with public evidence from the beginning of the conversation.

I'd like to know that I'm dealing with a professional, who takes their work seriously. And I'd like to know if I'm going to be dealing with fallout from next month's feature article as a matter of course, or if I'm being extorted to avoid publishing. (This is a thing).

>establish their credibility

>I'd like to know that I'm dealing with a professional, who takes their work seriously

As a sender of these emails, my credibility is established when you go to the location I say there's sensitive data being leaked, and you find sensitive data being leaked. Nothing else should matter.

Are you just going to keep data exposed publicly if, for example, some curious kid notified you instead of a professional?

Hostility to good-faith security research, as shown in the OPs article and in some of the comments here (not specifically you), makes everyone worse off.

Having myself received hostility, demands to prove my credibility, and legal threats when sending notifications like OPs, in most cases now I don't bother to notify anyone. Instead, the data just sits there, accessible to the actual bad guys. Hurray!

No, your "correctness" is established. The credibility of your report is established.

But your credibility as a professional non-extortionist is absolutely still in question, unfortunately.

Again, I've been on both sides. Being the only professional in the room is sometimes the way things work out. But that's OK, because you can walk away from the conversation still being the professional, and they cannot. This pays dividends.

I've run across people years later who apologized for being a jerk in our previous exchange. They were under pressure, didn't fully understand, felt insecure, blah blah whatever who cares. But they realized their error and got smarter for it. And I gained their respect. That doesn't work if you don't stay professional.

If I'm asked to be more professional or to prove my credibility to someone leaking the data of their customers, I just laugh. I owe nothing to the company being negligent. A notification email with all the pertinent details is what you get.

If a company isn't going to act on it after confirming my "correctness" just because they want me to show them my diploma and resume, that says a lot more about the company than it does me.

But don't fret, as I said the number of companies that forced me to jump through hoops to report a security issue, or threatened me after reporting one, has made it so I don't often bother anymore. Hopefully someone with a more professional tone emails instead, before the data gets sucked up by Lazarus Group or whoever.