[selcuka]

> I think consciousness arises from the brain.

I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me.

If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same time? If no, why? What would make you (the original) different from your replica?

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertiginous_question

[jstanley]

I feel like this is just a totally stupid question.

The brain has inputs, internal processing, and outputs. The conscious experience happens within the internal processing.

If you make a second copy, then that second copy will also have conscious experience, but it won't share any inputs or outputs or internal state with the first copy.

If you were to duplicate your computer, would the second computer share a filesystem with the first one? No. It would have a copy of a snapshot-in-time of the first computer's filesystem, but henceforth they are different computers, each with their own internal state.

You could argue that there are ways to do it which make it unclear which is the "original" computer and which is the "copy". That's fine, that doesn't matter. They both have the same history up to the branching point, and then they diverge. I don't see the problem.

[selcuka]

When you replace "I" with "it" (as in your example with computers) the question becomes meaningless and stupid. As an outside observer both computers are the same, as they act exactly the same way, therefore there is no question. That is actually the "egalitarian" view in Benj Hellie's paper [1]:

> The ‘god’s eye’ point of view taken in setting up the egalitarian metaphysics does not correspond to my ‘embedded’ point of view ‘from here’, staring out at a certain computer screen.

The vertiginous question (or Nagel's Hard Problem [2] to a degree: Why does physical brain activity produce a first-person perspective at all?) is about the subjectivity of consciousness. I see the world through my eyes, therefore there is only one "I" while there are infinitely many others.

The duplication example was something I made up to explain the concept, but to reiterate, if I could make a perfect copy of me, why would I still see the world from the first copy's eyes and not the second, if the physical structure of the brain defines "me"? What stops my consciousness from migrating from the first body to the second, or both bodies from having the same consciousness? Again, this question is meaningless when we are talking about others. It is a "why am I me" question and cannot be rephrased as "why person X is not person Y".

Obviously we don't have the capacity to replicate ourselves, but I, as a conscious being, instinctively know (or think) that I am always unique, regardless of how many exact copies I make.

As I mentioned in another comment, I don't have a formal education on philosophy, so I am probably doing a terrible job trying to explain it. This question really makes sense when it clicks, so I suggest you to read it from a more qualified person's explanation.

[1] http://individual.utoronto.ca/benj/ae.pdf

[2] https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf

[card_zero]

Right, yes: Why does physical brain activity produce a first-person perspective?

We might ask "what else do we expect it to do?" A second person perspective makes even less sense. And since the brain's activity entails first-person-perspective-like processing, the next most obvious answer, no perspective at all, isn't plausible either. It's reasonable that the brain would produce a first person perspective as it thinks about its situation. (And you don't have extend this to objects that don't think, by the way, if you were thinking of doing that.)

But I'm still left with the impression that there's an unanswered question which this one was only standing in for. The question is probably "what is thinking, anyway?".

Or, something quite different: "Why don't I have the outside observer point of view?". It's somehow difficult to accept that when there are many points of view scattered across space (and time), you have a specific one, and don't have all of them: "why am I not omniscient?". It's egotistical to expect not to have a specific viewpoint, and yet it seems arbitrary (and thus inexplicable) that you do have one. But again, the real question is not "why is this so?" but "why does this seem like a problem?".

[seanwilson]

> if I could make a perfect copy of me, why would I still see the world from the first copy's eyes and not the second, if the physical structure of the brain defines "me"? What stops my consciousness from migrating from the first body to the second, or both bodies from having the same consciousness?

If you define consciousness as the stream of perceived experiences coming from the physical body (sights, sounds, touch, and even thoughts, including even the thought that you're in control), it's expected each body would have its own consciousness? The OP article about split-brain experiments also (very counterintuitively) indicates that at least some thoughts are perceived rather than something you're actively doing?

[jstanley]

> Why does physical brain activity produce a first-person perspective at all?

I agree that this question is mysterious and fascinating, I just don't think the question of forking your consciousness bears on it at all.

The fact that first-person perspective exists is probably the fact that I am most grateful for out of all the facts that have ever been facts.

But I don't have any difficulty imagining forking myself into 2 copies that have a shared past and different futures.

[Timwi]

Personally, my answer to “why am I me” is similar to the anthropic principle. If you were anyone else, you would be asking the exact same question, and if you were nobody, you would not be able to ask the question. By asking the question, you must necessarily be somebody, and the question would be the same no matter which somebody.

[selcuka]

Your answer works when you are observing the person(s) from outside, referring to a third person (A and B are both conscious, so it doesn't matter which one is which). However, it doesn't answer when one of the subjects is "I", because I and everyone else is clearly different (hence the title of Benj Hellie's paper I linked above: Against Egalitarianism):

> The ‘god’s eye’ point of view taken in setting up the egalitarian metaphysics does not correspond to my ‘embedded’ point of view ‘from here’, staring out at a certain computer screen. The god’s eye mode of presentation of the Hellie-subject and the embedded mode of presentation of myself are different: as different as the manifest and scientific modes of presentation of water—indeed, perhaps even more so: that is the core of the Humean worry. So it is not a priori that any of those subjects is exactly the same thing as me. And if not, if I am told that it is this one that is me, I want to know why that is.

[jstanley]

Each one refers to itself as "I", I still don't see what is difficult about this.

[selcuka]

No, only you will refer to yourself as "I". The other one will call themselves "I" but it's not the same "I" as you. For all we know you are not even sure that the other one is really a conscious being or a robot powered by an AI that could pass the Turing test [1].

> I still don't see what is difficult about this.

You have been dismissing two of the most profound questions of philosophy, and unfortunately I am not able to explain the questions (let alone attempt to answer them) any better. There is some serious philosophical and neurological research [2] related to this subject. Maybe you should spend some time yourself researching the literature.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

[2] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228618472_The_Even_...

[trescenzi]

I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole system there would be a duplicate that would begin experiencing its own version of reality.

[selcuka]

> I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism.

Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation, that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's definitely an astonishing question.

You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from your point of view), and the replica would be someone else. In this context you claim that there is a new consciousness now, but there was supposed to be one, because our initial assumption was consciousness == brain.

You are right if you define consciousness as being able to think, but when you define it as what makes you "you", then it becomes harder to explain who the replica is. It has everything (all the neurons) that makes you "you", but it is still not "you".

The above may not make sense as it is difficult for a layman such as me to explain the vertiginous question to someone else. I suggest you to read the relevant literature.

[ssfrr]

Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. One of us would have the experience of walking into the machine and walking out again, and the other would have the experience of walking into the machine and being teleported into the other chamber.

Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant background, but I’m having trouble thinking of an alternative.

[selcuka]

> My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”.

You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical zombie [1] for all you know.

Would the "current you" feel any different after the duplication? Most people, including me, would find this counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels to the other end of the world? What would you see? The question is not how the replica would think and act from an outside observer's perspective, but would it have the same consciousness as you. Would you call the replica "I"?

Or to make it more complex, what would happen if you save your current state to a hard disk, and an exact duplicate gets manufactured 100 years after you die, using the stored information?

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

[kristiandupont]

Like GP, I feel that I might be imagining imagination here, but I really don't follow what this is supposed to reveal.

>Would you call the replica "I"?

The two would start out identical and immediately start to diverge like twins. They would share memories and personality but not experience? What am I missing here?

[polishdude20]

I too don't get what's being missed.

[jstanley]

> Would you call the replica "I"?

Both of the replicas would refer to themselves as "I", but neither would refer to the other as "I".

[trescenzi]

Oh yes if the question is if the duplicate is also _me_ then I understand the concern. That’s a much more complicated question. But when it comes to perspective it’s easy to answer. Which I guess is literally what the wiki page says it makes more sense as you state it though.

Thanks for the additional explanation. I have read a good deal from Nagel to Chalmers and somehow missed this particular question.

[selcuka]

> I have read a good deal from Nagel to Chalmers and somehow missed this particular question.

Chalmers' "Hard Problem" is very similar, although not exactly the same. My understanding is that it asks "why is there something called consciousness at all", as in, a robot doesn't have the notion of "I", but for some reason we do. The question is hard because it is hard to explain it only by our brains being more complex than a robot's CPU. Hellie's question is "why am I me and not someone else".

[card_zero]

Yes, the two of you would see through two pairs of eyes, independently.

Both of you would be you, and you two would function separately, occupy separate spaces, and diverge slightly in ways that would only rarely make a difference to your personality.

But that's not the vertiginous question, which is "why am I me". I've wondered that before. However, it is nonsense. Naturally a person is that person, not some other person (and a tree is a tree, not some other tree). There's nothing strange about this. Why would it be otherwise? So the urge to ask the question really reveals some deep-seated misconception, or some other question that actually makes sense, and I wonder what that is.

[jodrellblank]

I wonder if the origin of the question is the religious idea of a separate immortal soul which popped into this body and not into some other body - but in some way could have. This concept is in popular discourse like “what if I had been born in Italy in 1420?!” as if that were a thing thats plausible - an “I” separate from this body/place/time/life experiences/memories/language/family/etc but somehow still ‘me’.

Boring materialism view is that a brain with genetics mixed from my parents and raised in the way I was raised, with the experiences I had here and in this time, is what makes “me” and I couldn’t be anywhere or anyone else.

Or another way, we are all everyone else - what it would be like if I was born to your parents and raised like you is … you. What you would be like here is… me.

[selcuka]

> I wonder if the origin of the question is the religious idea of a separate immortal soul

I don't think so. This is a profound question in philosophy, and it may even predate religions, even though it is hard to separate philosophy from theology. The answer (if there is one) doesn't have to be metaphysical.

Also the question is not about your genetics, your character, or "being someone like X" per se. Your twin brother could be genetically (let's say 100%) identical, but still you are you and he is he. There is only one "I" and everyone else is, well, other people. Being "I" has nothing to do with my experiences. No matter what I will experience in the future, I will still see the world through the same pair of eyes.

If you change the question from "I vs someone else" to "person 1 vs person 2" it stops making sense. From your point of view "p1" and "p2" are interchangeable and you wouldn't know which one is which. When one of the subjects is "I" then the symmetry disappears and the vertiginous question appears.

[card_zero]

Well, if I were you, I wouldn't worry about it.

[layer8]

> What would make you (the original) different from your replica?

You’d be in two different locations, have independent experiences, and your world lines would quickly diverge. Both of you would remember a common past.

How do you know when you wake up in the morning that you are the same “I” as you remember from the previous day? Who isn’t to say that the universe didn’t multiply while you were asleep, and now there are two or more of you waking up?

(You don’t actually need to go to sleep to do this: https://cheapuniverses.com/)

[selcuka]

> How do you know when you wake up in the morning that you are the same “I” as you remember from the previous day?

I don't know. That doesn't invalidate the questions, though:

- Why am I me at this instant and not someone else (Hellie's vertiginous question)

- Why should there be a first person perspective at all (Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness) [2]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertiginous_question

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness

[detourdog]

I think this is what severance is about.

[peterlada]

It would be a fork. Identical experience until that point but bifurcated from the point of fork since it no longer occupies the same physical space

[spiderfarmer]

New commits.