[parhamn]

> This makes that entire goal moot

I agree. Perhaps it's why I find the discussions like nonce-lengths and randomness sources almost insane (in the sense of willfully missing the forrest from the trees). Intelligence agencies have managed to penetrate the most secretive and powerful organizations known to man. Why would one think Signal's supply chain is impervious? I'd assume the opposite.

[inor0gu]

I don't think they are insane, they are quite useful when designing security mechanisms, while at the same time being utter noise for the end-user benefiting from that system.

> If you're building a chip to generate prime numbers I do surely hope you know how to select randomness or make constant time & branch free algorithms, just like an engineer designing elevators better know what should be the tensile strength of the cable it'll use. In either cases, it's mumbo jumbo for me, and I just need to get on with my day.

Part of what muddies the water is our collective inability to separate the two contexts, or empower tech communicators to do it. If we keep making new tech akin to esoteric magic, no one will board the elevator.

[parhamn]

I almost find it worse. Using your analogy its akin to doing atomic simulations on the elevator cable quality, but the elevator car is missing a bottom/floor.

[542354234235]

But depending on your threat model, it can still be useful. If a state actor has a backdoor into something, would they burn that capability to get you? If you are a dissident in a totalitarian government, you would expect them to throw everything at you and not tell anyone how/why. If you are terrorizing and could be tried in a “classified” setting, you would expect them to throw everything at you. If you are Jane Average passing nudes and talking about doing a little Molly last weekend and would have a lawyer go through discovery, you are probably safe.