[throw0101d]

> The only EU member with nuclear weapons is France, which has it's own domestic nuclear ecosystem.

The UK has US-derived (?) nuclear weapons, and so it would perhaps make sense for them to hire the Americans that maintained them:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_of_the_United_...

Given the 'waffling' of Trump on NATO support, Poland may want to develop their own.

Also South Korea and Japan may want to ramp up their own native infrastructure given the waffling of US Pacific support.

[alephnerd]

> The UK

Not in the EU.

And the same NatSec requirements hold.

> Poland may want to develop their own.

A nuclear shield is useless without second or third strike capabilities - which requires a nuclear triad - as both Russia and China have developed those capabilities due to their rivalry with the US.

Poland hypothetically building 10 nuclear devices does nothing if Russia can launch multiple strike after getting striked.

Furthermore, developing nuclear weapons is causus belli enough to justify a hot war for China or Russia, nor does it actually prevent war as can be seen with the Kargil War.

More critically, nuclear programs are expensive and that money is better used in further building out conventional military capabilities, as can be seen with the Russia-Ukraine War, where a country with an ossified MIC (Ukraine) is able to cause significant pain to a nuclear power.

Tl;dr - Nuclear weapons alone are useless in a world where most Nuclear Powers (US, Russia, China, India, Israel) have a nuclear triad and multi-strike capabilities.

> Also South Korea and Japan may

The Indo-Pac theatre is different from the European theatre, as there is bipartisan support to prioritize Asian defense over European defense.

Furthermore, in a situation where American support is reduced, Asian countries can continue to retain conventional warfighting capabilities. This is because defense spending across Asia had always been high since the early-mid 2010 standoffs, so there hasn't been the same level of angst that much of Central Europe has.

Furthermore, Korean and Japanese military exports are extremely competitive, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines all closely aligning with SK and JP on defense posture.

[mytailorisrich]

Nuclear weapons are not meant to be used. They are meant to prevent invasion attempts.

For instance, between China and its own nuke North Korea is guaranteed not to be invaded by the US.

Likewise, Israel is guaranteed that Arab countries or Iran won't try to invade it.

In fact, that's why France developed its own nukes, in addition to making sure they'll keep a seat at the "adults table".

Poland might be/have been another good example. They would only need to guarantee that St Petersburg, Moscow, and Minsk would be vaporised in case of invasion to be safe on their Eastern border.

[alephnerd]

> Poland might be/have been another good example. They would only need to guarantee that St Petersburg, Moscow, and Minsk would be vaporised in case of invasion to be safe on their Eastern border

As I mentioned above, the fear of vaporization goes away if you can continue to keep striking after being striked. If you've reached the point where you are launching nuclear strikes, you accept the massive toll that you will have to pay with a launch, and wish to enact as severe a toll as possible. To do that you need second strike and nuclear triad capabilities.

Every single one of the countries you mentioned has second strike capabilities and either has Nuclear Triad capabilities (China, US, Israel) or is working to implement them (France, North Korea).

A country like Poland or Germany is too late in the game to build second strike or nuclear triad capabilities, and even starting a nuclear weapons program would be causus belli enough in the short-to-medium term for a war while being unable to prevent a strike.

[mytailorisrich]

No,the fear does not go away. The point is that Russia isn't even going to try if they know their main cities are going to be wiped. Whether they can possibly ultimately "win" because irrelevant if it is a pyrrhic victory and/or cost is to high.

[alephnerd]

> The point is that Russia isn't even going to try if they know their main cities are going to be wiped

And my argument is if you as a state are seriously consider a nuclear strike, you have accepted that millions will die, but it's better to completely wipe out the other opponent. No amount of rationalization can resolve that level of existential threat. Poland saying "we can threaten to nuke Moscow" is enough of a justification for Russia to view Poland as an existential threat to wipe off the map.

Large countries, and especially large nuclear powers, have multiple cities where industries are distributed. This remains true in Russia, as most of their military manufacturing capabilities remain spread out across Omsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, etc.

If you wish to scare a country from fighting a war with you, even conventional capabilities are enough to highlight the pain while also not reaching the threshold where a conflict becomes existential.

So no, it does not make sense for Poland or Germany to develop nuclear capabilities so late in modern world.

[mytailorisrich]

France can nuke Moscow and is still there, North Korea caan nuke Seoul and Tokyo and is still there.. once you have credible nukes you can't be wiped out, that's the point of having them.

There is no being 'late', either. It's about the threats.

I have never implied that Poland should develop nuclear weapons. I wrote that they are/were in the very situation in which nuclear weapons may be desirable (similar to France, Israel, North Korea). Relatively small countries have nukes simply to make any attempt at invasion not worth it even if everyone knows they can't "win" against the USSR/Russia/the US, anyway.

[actionfromafar]

Russia is not the USSR. In practice, Russia is Moscow and St Petersburg. Pose a credible threat to those cities and be set. Because Poland and Russia are so close geographically, plausible second strike capability can be achieved many ways without having ICBMs and nuclear strike subs.

[alephnerd]

If you're at the point where you're actively considering nuclear strikes, you are fine with accepting the MASSIVE costs that arise.

Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated.

> Russia is not the USSR

It's not the USSR, but it's still a large country, and much of the defense industry has remained in Siberia since WW2.

[ben_w]

I'd focus on your previous point about second-strike capabilities.

> Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated.

Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that.

Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country.

Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.

This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)

[alephnerd]

> Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.

If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.

> This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)

Absolutely, but the issue is that this takes A LOT of time to build and implement, and a country like Poland or Germany cannot build that kind of capability overnight. Yet a nuclear program can be viewed as an existential threat that can be used as a causus belli for war (conventional or nuclear).

This is a pretty bad RoI.

Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.

And this is why you never hear Polish or German military leadership talk about developing a nuclear program.

[ben_w]

> If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.

No, because it's not symmetric.

Party A may be an existential threat to party B, party B can prevent that existential threat just by being sufficiently painful. B doesn't even have to be close to an existential threat to A for it to be painful enough to reconsider.

That's how bees keep humans away from hives. Also how the Irish kicked my great-grandparents generation out of controlling Ireland, even at the height of the British empire.

> Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.

Yes, they are expensive. Also, I expect a multi-polar nuclear arms race to go hot much more easily, to normalise their use, to generally be bad for everyone.

So I hope you are correct (or, more importantly, that your opinion is shared by decision makers). On the other, there's clearly a constant undercurrent of "let's not give too much more aid to Ukraine just in case the Russian nukes actually work", so I don't think it's seen that way.

> German military leadership

Given the local attitudes towards even nuclear reactors, I think it's just a political non-starter around here. (I'll have to wait and see if @TeMPOraL sees this and responds regarding Poland's politics?)

[actionfromafar]

It's not existenial if you don't have anyone on the other side of the "deal" to offer nuclear strikes in return. So far, it's been the US, but that doesn't seem assured for the future anymore.