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You have the ability to push files from one AppVM to another - they appear in ~/QubesIncoming/[source-vm-name]/ and you can do what you want with them from there. I do this regularly and it works perfectly fine. It's not drag-and-drop, there be demons. It's either a command line utility or a context menu in the file explorer.

There's no concept of a local shared folder you can mount in multiple AppVMs, though as networking exists, you could easily do so, if you wanted - share a folder in StorageVM and mount it in others. Though doing so would defeat a lot of the point of isolation, if VM1 can corrupt a file that will then attack VM2 when read. You'd want to really think hard about your threat models and what you would and wouldn't want, with such a setup.

My advice? Dual boot. Yes, at some level, dual booting raises the risk of QubesOS compromise from the other booted OS, because it could pop /boot, and such. But in practical terms, you're no worse off doing that, than you are with another OS running full time - and as a lot of the threats are things like "ad-delivered malware" or "random PDF to your inbox being malicious," you gain quite a bit even if you still dual boot into something else on occasion. My daily driver X250 has a straight Ubuntu install on a separate SSD that I use on occasion, in theory. Mostly, it exists to run a VM to talk to a car, except I've not had to do that in a long while. Oh, and movie playback on long flights. Power efficiency for video playback on Qubes is "not good." Except I don't do those anymore either. So, every few months, I boot into the Ubuntu install and update it.

Caution: QubesOS, to the right sort of person, may as well be a virus. It took less than a year to go from "Play OS on a random laptop I was in the process of selling" to "Primary daily driver OS on several machines." And then I realized I didn't actually use the desktops anymore.