| > School fair use is different because that defense is written into the statute directly It's written into the statute as an example of something that would be fair use. > The idea that the schools are encouraging the students to compete with the original authors of works taught in the classroom is fanciful by the meaning that courts usually apply to competition. People go to art school primarily because they want to create art. People study computer science primarily because they want to write code. It's their direct intention and purpose to compete with existing works. > Your example is different from this case in which Ross wanted to compete in the same market against West offering a similar service at a lower price. So if you use Windows and then want to create Linux... > Another reason that the schools get a carveout is because it would make most education impractical without each school obtaining special licenses for public performance for every work referenced in the classroom. How is that logic any different than for AI training? > But maybe that also provokes the question as to if schools really deserve that kind of sweetheart treatment (a massive indirect subsidy), or does it over-privileges formal schools relative to the commons at large? It not only doesn't have any explicit requirement for a formal school (it just says "teaching"), it also isn't limited to teaching, teaching is just one of the things specified in the statute as being the kind of thing Congress intended fair use to include. |
Statutory text controls what the courts can do, even and perhaps especially when it includes an example.
>People go to art school primarily because they want to create art. People study computer science primarily because they want to write code. It's their direct intention and purpose to compete with existing works.
Interesting perspective.
>So if you use Windows and then want to create Linux...
I don't understand your meaning.
>How is that logic any different than for AI training?
That is what Mark Lemley, law professor at Stanford, has argued in his many law review articles and amicus briefs: he believes that training is analogous to learning. The court here didn't agree with the Lemley view.
>It not only doesn't have any explicit requirement for a formal school (it just says "teaching"), it also isn't limited to teaching, teaching is just one of the things specified in the statute as being the kind of thing Congress intended fair use to include.
In practice courts tend to limit these exceptions to formal teaching arrangements.