[tptacek]

Whether FIPS 140 is actually a good target for cryptography is another question

Answer to that question: it is not. It's a thing you only do when you are forced to by some requisitions process.

[MisterTea]

> It's a thing you only do when you are forced to by some requisitions process.

We're going through a FIPS compliance project right now and it's nothing more than a miserably expensive set of check boxes. Contractor they hired is incompetent so that isn't helping either.

[ArchOversight]

Either projects start shipping FIPS enabled or companies have to rebuild and repackage projects with FIPS enabled.

With OpenSSL installed system wide you can turn on a flag and the library will force it into FIPS mode internally, with Go unless you build your binaries to link against OpenSSL like this Microsoft Go release seems to be doing you don't get that instant on system wide.

[AaronFriel]

I had a hunch you'd reply and say as much!

It's just unfortunate for the many orgs delivering software that eventually customers start demanding this and it was really painful in Go.

[lantastic]

Does this mean FIPS-enabled software never runs as such in production (or at all) in environments where it is supposedly mandated?

[ArchOversight]

Most projects that compile against OpenSSL can be forced into FIPS mode by setting a flag that the OpenSSL library uses to force enable FIPS mode when it is loaded.

Golang projects however don't compile against OpenSSL instead using the internal cryptography. In many cases rebuilding and repackaging a Golang based tool is a no-no since now you are accepting ownership of it in an audit, when instead you want to point to an upstream vendor, or source code is not available.

So in many cases in production while the system itself is in FIPS mode (Linux kernel), and applications using system crypto libraries (OpenSSL primarily) are in FIPS mode, Go binaries are not in FIPS mode and may end up using algorithms that are explicitly disallowed by the FIPS standards.

[prerok]

I don't understand the question.

We created software and we wanted it to be secure (by ourselves). When it came to FIPS compliance, we had to pay for certification, but we were already compliant anyway, so it was only procedure.

It's definitely not as strict as the latest developments in crypto would demand, but it does cover the product in its entirety. Like, oh, you have encryption, but you have a backdoor here: not FIPS-2 compliant.

So, yes, plenty of software and products are FIPS compliant. And if it's mandated, then the provider is not chosen.

[lantastic]

FIPS and "be secure" aren't necessarily a full overlap: there's plenty of ways to be secure that isn't even allowed in FIPS, so you need to actively disable that set if you run FIPS mode (depending on libraries used, this may e.g. disqualify hardware intrinsics because it was not covered by CMVP, creating potentially material performance consequences).

If you're already compliant (implying you are using FIPS compliant crypto in all situations), the matter is tautological.

[prerok]

Well, I agree that if you are using alternate means to achieve the same effect (or better!) and that's not recognized by the FIPS compliance then that can be painful.

My experience lies mostly in C and embedded applications, where the physical security was also in question and that is where the most of the effort to certify went. Software was relatively easy by using the right versions. So, maybe not just a certification, but non-fretting one.

[tptacek]

There are people here better positioned to answer than than I am. We've said "no" to customers who asked for this.

[treesknees]

In some cases that's true, but not all. We have customers who require that our software supports running in a FIPS compliant mode, but never actually end up enabling it in production. But they wouldn't have bought our software without the option of enabling FIPS mode.