[coliveira]

I think the biggest advantage of wasm in terms of security is that it doesn't accept machine language written in the target machine, only in this artificial machine language. This means that it cannot encode arbitrary code that could be executed by the host machine. Everything it runs has necessarily to go through the wasm interpreter.

[wyldfire]

> This means that it cannot encode arbitrary code that could be executed by the host machine.

But the host machine still can, so it's not as big of advantage in that regard. If you could somehow deliver a payload of native code and jump to it, it'd work just fine. But the security you get is the fact that it's really hard to do that because there's no wasm instructions to jump to arbitrary memory locations (even if all the host ISAs do have those). Having a VM alone doesn't provide security against attacks.

It's often the case that VMs are used with memory-safe languages and those languages' runtime bounds checks and other features are what gives them safety moreso than their VM. In fact, most bytecode languages provide a JIT (including some wasm deployments) so you're actually running native code regardless.

[hb-robo]

That's quite interesting. This is way outside of my wheelhouse - has this kind of approach been tried in other security contexts before? What would you even call that, virtualization?

[dmitrygr]

The word is "bytecode" and the idea is as old as computing.

[tubs]

Java.