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Zizek has a very interesting argument [1] that is perhaps relevant here. (Lightly cleaned up transcript) > Imagine you are a small girl or boy of, let's say, eight years. It's Sunday afternoon and your father wants you to visit your old grandmother. You, of course, detest it - she's old, senile, whatever. But then, if you have an old authoritarian father, he will tell you something like - and this would be, as Alenka put it, a good thing to do - he will tell you: "Listen, I don't care how you feel. Just do your duty, go to your grandmother and behave there properly." That's perfect, I claim, because you will retain your, let's call it, inner freedom. You will be furious at your father, but that's good for your long-term freedom. > Now, what would a monster called post-modern permissive father do? He would not give you an order, but he would have told you something like this: "You only go to visit your grandmother if you really want to. Just remember how much your grandmother loves you." Now, a child is not an idiot, and he or she will know perfectly what this order means. Beneath the appearance of a free choice, it gives you a much harsher order. The order is not only "you must go and visit your grandmother," but "you must do it freely." You must really wish to visit your grandmother. > So you see, this nice example of how - and this is basically what also Alenka described as that situation - "do whatever you want," etc., where the apparent freedom of choice masks a much harsher choice. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZoheZbxT6I |