[Aeolun]

The problem with Gitlab CI is that now you need to use Gitlab.

I’m not even sure when I started feeling like that was a bad thing. Probably when they started glueing a bunch of badly executed security crud onto the main product.

[lolinder]

The earliest warning sign I had for GitLab was when they eliminated any pricing tier below their equivalent of GitHub's Enterprise tier.

That day, they very effectively communicated that they had decided they were only interested in serving Enterprises, and everything about their product has predictably degraded ever since, to the point where now they're now branding themselves "the most comprehensive AI-powered DevSecOps Platform" with a straight face.

[Espressosaurus]

GitLab can't even show you more than a few lines of context without requiring you to manually click a bunch of times. Forget the CI functionality, for pull requests it's absolutely awful.

[plagiarist]

I decided it was a bad thing when they sent password reset emails to addresses given by unauthenticated users. Not that I ever used them. But now it is a hard no, permanently.

They have since had other also severe CVEs. That has made me feel pretty confident in my decision.

[reshlo]

If password reset emails shouldn’t be sent to unauthenticated users, how would users reset their passwords?

[dijit]

there was a pretty bad bug (though I think it was a rails footgun)- that allowed you to append an arbitrary email to the reset request.

The only difficult part for the attacker was finding an email address that was used by the target; though thats hsually the same as you use for git commits; and gitlab “handily” has an email address assigned to each user-id incrementing from 1;

Usually low numbers are admins, so, a pretty big attack vector when combined.