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by sadpluto
5083 days ago
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Thanks for answering! What I don't understand is that, given that your starting point is "two computers talking over a malicious network", doesn't the current state of affairs of (unencrypted)DNS mean that it's game over from the outset? That is, if the network is malicious, that MITM could very refer you to an invalid IP address the moment you first try to resolve, say, mail.google.com. Please don't take this as an argument. I just want to know where I'm wrong! I just can't get over the idea of pushing at the (justifiably) paranoid level for HTTPS while we still have plain-text DNS... even with DNSSEC! Wish request: Your thoughts on http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4268461. |
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The key is that the IP address doesn't matter, indeed it shouldn't matter whether the traffic is going over carrier pigeon. You have a name that you wish to connect to, say example.com, and you have some way to send an receive packets. If the other end can prove that they are example.com by means of a certificate then you have a secure connection. How the data gets there and back is immaterial to transport security.